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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION  
 
DREAMSTIME.COM, LLC, a 
Florida LLC, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
GOOGLE, LLC, a Delaware LLC; 
and DOES 1-10, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 Case No.  
 
CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR:  
 
(1) VIOLATION OF SECTION 
TWO OF THE SHERMAN 
ACT; 
(2)  BREACH OF CONTRACT; 
(3)  BREACH OF THE IMPLIED   
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING; AND 
(4) VIOLATION OF SECTION 
17200 et seq. OF THE 
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CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & 
PROFESSIONS CODE -
UNFAIR BUSINESS 
PRACTICES 
 
[DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL] 
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Plaintiff Dreamstime.com, LLC (“Dreamstime”), through its undersigned 
counsel, hereby brings this Complaint against Google, LLC (“Google”), and DOES 
1-10 (collectively “Defendants”) for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 
U.S.C. § 2), breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and unfair business practices, to secure damages and injunctive relief, and 
demanding trial by jury, and claims and alleges as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. This lawsuit arises out of Google’s anticompetitive, discriminatory, and 
unfair conduct, as well as its related, on-going breaches of its contracts with 
Dreamstime.  Google has engaged in a strategy to use its monopoly power in the 
relevant market for online search advertising to squeeze its customer, Dreamstime, 
and other similarly-situated competitors, out of the online stock photography 
business.  This strategy is intended to and does further entrench Google’s monopoly 
of the relevant online search advertising market by eliminating sites such as 
Dreamstime that threaten to be the first place people go to search for high-quality 
images for purchase on the Internet (instead of searching on Google). 
2. Google’s presence in online search is so ubiquitous and dominant that a 
new verb “google,” meaning to use an Internet search engine to locate information 
on the web, has entered the common vernacular.  Google has literally defined online 
search and, accordingly, dominates it.   
3. Google’s maintenance and abuse of its online search advertising 
monopoly is intentional and widely known.  For example, Google’s illegal, 
anticompetitive “search bias” tactics have been widely reported and investigated by 
governments around the world.  The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have both recognized that Google is a 
monopolist in the relevant antitrust market of online search advertising.  In this case, 
Google has brought to bear several complementary and insidious anticompetitive 
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tactics to strong-arm Dreamstime and others out of the online stock photography 
business, so as to strengthen its monopoly in online search advertising.   
4. In or about the second half of 2015, sensing an opportunity to exploit 
its monopoly power in the online search advertising market by restraining trade in 
other lucrative related lines of commerce like online stock photography repositories, 
Google began to abuse its monopoly power in the online search advertising market 
to exclude Dreamstime from the most common online searches for stock 
photography.  As part of its anticompetitive scheme, it entered into a licensing 
agreement with Dreamstime’s biggest competitor, Shutterstock.1  Google set about 
using its immense market power in online search advertising to bolster 
Shutterstock’s market position in the online stock photography business, while at the 
same time unfairly hamstringing Dreamstime’s ability to compete and increasing 
Dreamstime’s spending on Google’s online advertising services.  Google 
intentionally altered its search algorithm – or, at least, how that algorithm was 
applied to Dreamstime – to unfairly prejudice Dreamstime and favor Google’s own 
services and those of its partner, Shutterstock, providing them an unearned and 
crucial competitive advantage over Dreamstime.   
5. More recently, in February of 2018, Google announced yet another 
licensing agreement with Getty Images, another extremely large competitor of 
Dreamstime.  Almost immediately, Getty Images’ websites began to receive even 
more prominence in Google’s search results, at times surpassing Shutterstock 
(which also continues to rank very highly). 2  The implementation of this agreement 
                                                 
1 “Shutterstock” is defined for purposes of this lawsuit to include Shutterstock 
and the online stock photography websites owned by Shutterstock such as Bigstock 
(www.bigstockphoto.com). 
2 Since the middle of February 2018, Getty Images has ranked more highly than 
Shutterstock at times, though Shutterstock also remains highly ranked in Google 
search results.  “Getty Images” is defined for purposes of this lawsuit to include 
(footnote continued) 
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is too early to assess completely, but it is sure to increase Google’s ability to 
manipulate and discriminate in the online stock photography industry and to 
increase the effects of Google’s anticompetitive conduct against Dreamstime and 
others.  Meanwhile, Dreamstime – for years in the top three to five most 
prominently displayed stock photography Google search results – has vanished from 
the first several pages of search results, making it invisible to all who google for 
stock photography.   
6. Because of this change to Google’s search algorithm in or around 
August 2015 (and with material changes continuing to the present), Dreamstime’s 
ranking on Google’s search engine plummeted from at or near the top of search 
results for online stock photographs to 91st (as much as 20 pages deep) – well below 
Shutterstock and Getty Images, well below other smaller competitors, and even well 
below unambiguously less relevant search results.  Essentially, Dreamstime is 
invisible to people googling for online stock photographs.  As a result, Google 
devastated Dreamstime’s business, cost it millions of dollars in sales and threatens 
its survival.  Google’s alteration of its algorithm did not serve to benefit the 
consumer but was intended to increase its partners’ and its own businesses and to 
discriminate against and harm Dreamstime.  Google has since replicated this 
monopoly conduct to exclude other similarly-situated competitors, including 123RF, 
DepositPhotos, and CanStockPhoto, who have all suffered inexplicable drops in 
online search rankings.  The only significant stock photography competitor that has 
not announced a partnership with Google and that has not yet been excluded from 
top search results is Adobe. 
                                                 
Getty Images and the online stock photography websites owned by Getty Images 
such as iStock (www.istockphoto.com) and Thinkstock 
(www.thinkstockphotos.com).  
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7. There is no legitimate, procompetitive purpose for Google’s intentional 
tanking of Dreamstime’s and others’ search rankings, and it hurts consumers in 
addition to Dreamstime.  Dreamstime’s prior higher search ranking has now been 
usurped in part by much smaller, old or irrelevant websites – including websites that 
traffic only in public domain images.3  Google’s manipulation of its algorithm to 
lower Dreamstime’s search ranking makes it harder for users to find what they are 
looking for – high-quality websites (like Dreamstime) that offer commercially 
acceptable stock photographs not in the public domain.  Dreamstime’s prior high 
ranking reflected and arose directly from the fact that it was a result that consumers 
found very responsive to their searches.  More alarmingly, the effective exclusion of 
Dreamstime and other similarly-situated competitors from Google’s search results is 
a banishment from the marketplace and is likely to result in depriving users of an 
informed search that would allow them to choose the best price/quality options.  
8. The aim and the result of this conduct is to maintain and abuse 
Google’s monopoly over online search advertising to exclude and restrict 
competition in the online stock photography business through its partners and 
proxies Shutterstock and Getty Images (as well as its own service, Google Images, 
as described below).  In addition to harming Dreamstime, this conduct harms 
competition in the online stock photography business and further entrenches 
Google’s monopoly in online search advertising.  Google’s favoritism of 
                                                 
3 Public domain images are, for the most part, unusable as a reasonable substitute 
for properly licensed stock images because public domain images lack the kind of 
intellectual property vetting, rights releases, and documentation that would permit 
use in a commercial context.  Using a public domain image for a commercial 
website, where a licensed stock image should have appeared, can draw potential 
claims from the image’s author, any models that appear in the image, and/or the 
owner of any copyrighted material that the image author may have inadvertently 
captured.  
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Shutterstock is most tellingly depicted in “knowledge graphs,” which are entries that 
appear at the very top of organic search results for generic terms like “stock photos.”  
An example is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”  In Exhibit “A,” Shutterstock and 
Bigstock (which Shutterstock owns) are placed prominently alongside search results 
for generic market terms, giving them an additional unfair advantage over other 
competitors like Dreamstime.   
9. In addition to its promotion of Shutterstock and Getty Images to the 
exclusion of Dreamstime and others, Google also benefits by promoting its own 
image search service, Google Images, to the exclusion of Dreamstime and others.  
(Notably, as detailed below, Google was fined €2.4 billion when it did the same 
thing for its own service, Google Shopping, in the European Union.)  Google 
Images is the biggest repository of images in the world.  Now, anything a user 
googles that includes words like “photos,” “images,” “pictures” or “pics,” 
will trigger a set of Google Images results for that thing.  Some of the images that 
result are “free,” yet others of the images are copyrighted stock photos that Google 
Images enables a searcher to steal without paying for them.4  More importantly, 
Google Images has misused licensed stock photos of Dreamstime and other websites 
by making high-quality versions of them available in Google Images search results.  
By simply right-clicking on high-resolution images of these proprietary stock photos 
in a Google Images result, searchers can essentially steal on a whim.  The Centre of 
the Picture Industry (“CEPIC”) estimates that 85% of pictures found online by 
visual search systems are unlawful copies and 80% of those illegal images have 
been spread through search engines such as Google Images.  This practice 
                                                 
4 Of course, even Google Images’ “free” images are not free – a user exchanges 
his or her all-important behavioral data and other private information when 
acquiring these images. 
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exemplifies the harm Google can cause through the exercise and abuse of its 
monopoly power.   
10. Google’s anticompetitive strategy against Dreamstime, however, is not 
limited to search bias, or the provision via Google Images of direct access to the 
proprietary stock photos of Dreamstime and similarly-situated participants.  
Dreamstime has long been an active participant/consumer in Google’s AdWords and 
DisplayAds online advertising programs, having paid Google over $50 million for 
these services over the last 12 years.  Dreamstime used AdWords to place targeted 
ads within Google search engine results relevant to online stock photographs.  Over 
time and through extensive research and experimentation, Dreamstime developed 
efficient AdWords and DisplayAds campaigns that resulted in many sales.  Though 
this efficiency in campaigns lowered Google’s AdWords profits, it benefitted 
consumers by lowering the marginal cost of acquired purchases and allowed 
Dreamstime to offer a more competitive price for its online stock photographs.  
After Google used its search bias scheme to artificially tank Dreamstime’s search 
ranking, Dreamstime began to invest even more money in its AdWords and 
DisplayAds campaigns – millions of dollars – to counter Google’s removal of 
Dreamstime from organic search results.  These inefficiencies increased the 
marginal cost of Dreamstime’s acquired purchases, placing a serious strain on its 
finances and business model.  Google perversely profited from its anticompetitive 
search bias scheme by obtaining an unfair and anticompetitive premium for its 
AdWords service.  After Google’s demotion of Dreamstime’s organic search 
ranking, most months Dreamstime barely breaks even or loses money.  The risks 
and negative impact to Dreamstime’s future prospects are obvious and directly 
attributable to Google’s discriminatory conduct, all of which increases Google’s 
monopoly of the online search advertising market. 
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11. Google has intentionally and aggressively interfered with Dreamstime’s 
AdWords and DisplayAds campaigns in several material ways.  Among other 
things, Google has: 
• manipulated Dreamstime’s organic search ranking unfairly and 
illegally to force Dreamstime to spend an unreasonable amount of 
money on additional AdWords campaigns that would not otherwise 
have been necessary; 
• cancelled Dreamstime’s most successful ad campaigns without 
adequate notice or explanation; 
• improperly suspended Dreamstime’s account based on unfounded 
accusations of “policy violations;” 
• prevented Dreamstime from running successful DisplayAds campaigns 
while allowing the exact same advertisements to be placed by other 
competitors; 
• placed Dreamstime’s advertisements on irrelevant websites and error 
pages in direct violation of the AdWords contract; and 
• overdelivered AdWords campaigns, causing daily spending limits for 
certain campaigns to be exceeded on a regular and systematic basis. 
12. Google’s use of the AdWords, DisplayAds, and AdSense programs to 
harm Dreamstime and others are part of an overall, anticompetitive and exclusionary 
business strategy that goes hand-in-hand with Google’s online search bias scheme.  
With respect to a similar scheme, the European Union recently issued a record €2.42 
billion fine against Google for its abuse of its market dominance as a search engine 
to promote its own Google Shopping services in its search results and demote those 
of competitors.  Here, as it was found to have done with Google Shopping in the 
EU, Google is illegally promoting its proxies’ stock photography sites and its own 
Google Images services by demoting other stock photography sites like 
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Dreamstime.  Google is misusing its monopoly power in the relevant online search 
advertising market to control and restrict competition among online stock 
photography websites, which are repositories for an important thing that consumers 
search for (high-quality, online images to purchase).  In the process, Google’s 
tactics have directly and proximately caused serious, material injuries to 
Dreamstime in the form of lost revenue, lost customers, potential search engine 
optimization (“SEO”) penalties, and loss of goodwill.  More importantly, Google’s 
unfair tactics have harmed competition in the online stock photography business, 
reducing consumer choice, and giving Shutterstock and Getty Images, Google’s 
partners and proxies in the online stock photography business, an unwarranted 
competitive advantage over Dreamstime and other smaller rivals.   
13. Among other things, this conduct resulted in fewer choices of online 
stock photographs for consumers, stifling of innovation and technology, and harm to 
competition as a whole.  It also resulted in substantially enhanced market share for 
Google’s partner, Shutterstock, and is likely to do so for Getty Images as well.  Most 
importantly, it allows Google to maintain and enhance its monopoly in online search 
advertising by ensuring that stock photography repository websites will increase 
their reliance on Google and AdWords for new customer acquisitions.  Similarly, 
Google’s monopolistic actions with respect to AdWords and DisplayAds gives rise 
to civil liability, including but not limited to a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
violation of California’s strict and sweeping unfair competition laws. 
II. THE PARTIES 
14. Plaintiff Dreamstime.com, LLC is a limited liability company 
incorporated under the laws of Florida with its principal place of business located at 
1616 Westgate Circle, Brentwood, Tennessee 37027. 
15. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company that is 
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a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc., with its principal place of business 
located at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043.  
16. Plaintiff Dreamstime is ignorant of the true names and capacities of 
defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 10, and therefore sues these defendants 
by such fictitious names.  Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true 
names and capacities as they are ascertained.  Plaintiff is informed and believes that 
each of the fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the 
injuries to plaintiff as alleged herein.  Plaintiff further alleges that its injuries were 
proximately caused by each and all such defendants. 
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
17. This Complaint is filed and this civil action is instituted under Sections 
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26) to recover the damages caused by, 
and to secure injunctive relief against the named defendant’s past, continuing, and 
on-going violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2).  This Court has 
original, diversity, and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this civil 
action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1337 because it involves claims arising 
under the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2), and diversity between the parties exists.     
18. Venue is proper in this District as all parties consented to venue and 
jurisdiction in the state of California, County of Santa Clara as the mandatory forum 
to enforce or interpret the operative agreements that form part of the basis of this 
action.  In particular, Google’s Advertising Program Terms (the “AdWords 
Agreement”) contain a forum selection clause calling for venue in Santa Clara 
County, California.  The AdWords Agreement also provides that California law 
governs the Agreement.  All parties that desire to use Google AdWords must first 
agree to the AdWords Agreement before they can create an AdWords account at 
https://adwords.google.com.   
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19. Defendant maintains an office and transacts business on a systematic 
and continuous basis within this District, and may be found here, within the 
meaning of 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391.  Further, the unlawful acts 
alleged herein were performed and occurred in material part within this District. 
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
A. Google Maintains a Monopoly in the Market for Online Search 
Advertising 
1. Google Has a Monopoly in the Online Search Market 
20. Google operates in multiple markets.  One of its most important 
markets is the online search market which is defined for purposes of this action as 
the domestic market for search engine queries.  As described below, Google 
monetizes its dominant position in search – which is ostensibly free to users – with a 
commensurately dominant position in the online search advertising market, in which 
Dreamstime is a consumer.  This Complaint first describes Google’s dominance in 
free or “organic” search and then how that dominance translates into commensurate 
dominance in the relevant product/service market of online search advertising.   
21. Google owns and operates the world's largest search engine and has 
established Google as one of the most influential companies in the world.  A “web 
search engine” is a software system that is designed to search for information on the 
World Wide Web.  The search results are generally presented in a line of results 
often referred to as search engine results pages (“SERPs”).  Consumers use search 
engines to find information on the Internet quickly.  Consumers enter a query into a 
search engine, typically a few keywords (e.g., “stock photos”), and the search 
engine then returns a list of results.  The usefulness of the search engine depends in 
large part on the relevance of the result set it gives back.  While there may be 
millions of web pages that include a particular word or phrase, some pages are more 
relevant, popular or authoritative than others.  Most search engines, including 
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Google, employ methods to rank the results to provide the “best” results first (its 
“search results”).  Most search engines, including Google, are commercial ventures 
supported by advertising revenue of various types. 
22. Google’s search engine uses a number of proprietary algorithms to rank 
websites in its search engine results.  Google claims that the algorithms allow its 
search engines to “return good answers” and help consumers find “pages with 
relevant information.”  Google claims its algorithms “sort through the hundreds of 
billions of webpages in our Search index to give you useful and relevant results in a 
fraction of a second.”  A website’s Google search ranking has a direct, measurable 
impact on the amount of web traffic to that website.  The Google ranking is so 
important to businesses (and especially online businesses) that entire industries exist 
relating to “optimizing” a website’s Google search ranking.  Google has stated that 
the primary purpose of its search algorithms is “giving relevant information.”  The 
other major online search engine companies deploy similar algorithms that rank 
relevant results based on a user’s search. 
23. According to netmarketshare.com, Google maintains 80.52% of the 
global market for online search engines.  By comparison, its largest competitors 
Baidu (5.94%), Yahoo (5.35%) and Bing (6.92%) collectively muster approximately 
17% of the market share.  Thus, Google has a global monopoly in the online search 
market.  Google also has a monopoly in the United States online search market.  For 
example, in 2017, Google’s share of the online search market performed from 
laptops or desktops fluctuated between 78.7% and 69.21 % according to 
netmarketshare.com.  In the mobile search market in the United States, Google has 
over 93% market share.  As a “business to business” platform that offers high-
resolution stock photographs, most of Dreamstime’s business comes from desktop 
or laptop purchases.  Mobile phones with limited bandwidth and storage are not as 
suited to downloading high resolution stock photographs.  At the same time, many 
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of Dreamstime’s contributors submit content via mobile phones and many potential 
customers sometimes search for stock photograph offerings on mobile devices and 
then later make purchases and downloads via desktops or laptops. 
24. There are a small number of participants in the online search market, 
and the market has high barriers to entry.  Engineering talent is limited and data 
centers that can simultaneously support millions of searches are expensive.  
Moreover, search engines have evolved such that most modern search engines are 
based on machine-learning algorithms combining thousands of factors.  Some of the 
most prominent factors are historical search query logs and their corresponding 
search result clicks.  One study cited in a 2015 Harvard Business Review article 
noted that historical search data improves search results up to 31%, meaning that in 
effect “today’s search engines cannot reach high-quality results without this 
historical user behavior.”5  The result is that new market participants, even those 
with better algorithms, “cannot enter the market and compete with the established 
players, with their deep records of previous user behavior.”  Data on user behavior 
in turn creates enormous network effects and critical mass that cannot be replicated 
by new entrants into the market. 
25. For example, several years ago Microsoft, currently in the 28th position 
in the Fortune 500 list, decided to launch a new search engine to compete with 
Google.  After years of struggling with unsuccessful search products and faced with 
the problem of building a competitive search engine without access to historical 
data, Microsoft formed an alliance with the internet company Yahoo!.  Pursuant to 
this alliance, Microsoft’s Bing search engine would power Yahoo!’s search.  The 
“Yahoo!-Microsoft Search Alliance” deal was formally signed in December 2009 
                                                 
5 See Radinsky, Kira, “Data Monopolists Like Google Are Threatening the 
Economy,” Harvard Business Review March 2, 2015.   
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and received legal clearances in 2010.  The alliance, however, never performed to 
Yahoo!’s expectations, lagging behind revenue projections, and the alliance was 
restructured in 2015.  Today, despite Microsoft’s vast resources and alliance with 
Yahoo!, Bing still lags well behind Google in the online search market.   
26. Microsoft’s experience in the online search market is particularly 
telling.  Microsoft entered the market with high brand recognition and visibility and 
as a highly sophisticated and experienced competitor in Internet technology.  
Notwithstanding its brand recognition and significant financial investment, 
Microsoft has not been able to significantly penetrate Google’s market dominance. 
27. This real-world example demonstrates the significant barriers to entry 
that exist in the online search market. 
28.   Google’s dominance in the online search market is so well-recognized 
that it has added a new verb to the English language.  On the website 
dictionary.com, there are three definitions for Google.  The first is a noun, referring 
to the company, Google.  The other two definitions are verbs:   
2.  verb (used with object), Googled, Googling. (often lowercase) to search 
the Internet for information about (a person, topic, etc.):  We googled the new 
applicant to check her background. 
3. verb (used without object), Googled, Googling (often lowercase) to use a 
search engine such as Google to find information, a website address, etc., on 
the Internet. 
29.   Some commentators have suggested that the zero-cost nature of free 
online search disqualifies this grouping from being considered a relevant market for 
antitrust purposes, and for this and other reasons the relevant market for purposes of 
this case is online search advertising.  To begin with, however, it must be noted that 
“free” search is not really free – consumers waive many privacy rights and provide 
very valuable behavioral data to Google when performing free searches.  This 
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behavioral data in turn creates vast network effects, which are large barriers to entry.  
In any event, the zero-cost aspect of online search does not immunize it from 
consumer harm.  As John M. Newman recently noted in a law review article for the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review entitled Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets:  
Foundations: 
Modern antitrust law is firmly grounded in neoclassical economics, 
which is in turn centered on price theory.  Steeped in price theory, 
preeminent antitrust theorists have urged that without prices there can 
be no markets, and consequently no market power.  This heavy 
methodological dependence on positive prices has led antitrust courts 
and enforcement agencies to overlook potentially massive welfare 
harms.  Unfortunately, recent empirical research confirms that such 
harms have already occurred . . . The absence of positive prices thus 
does not foreclose antitrust scrutiny; “trade,” for purposes of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, encompasses zero-price transactions.  To 
continue ignoring welfare harms in these markets would be both unjust 
and inefficient. 
2. Google Has a Monopoly in the Online Search Advertising 
Market 
30.   The online search advertising market is an appropriate relevant 
product/service market in which to assess Google’s market power, and its selection 
in lieu of online search as a whole has no legal or practical effect on the Sherman 
Act Section 2 analysis in this case.  Google’s dominance in the online search market 
translates to a commensurate dominance in the online search advertising market.  
Google’s share of the U.S. online search advertising market has steadily increased, 
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from 75.8% in 2016 to an estimated 80.2% by 2019.6  Other than Google, only 
Amazon, which held a mere 1.9% market share in 2016, is expected to increase its 
market share over the next two years (to a mere estimated 2.2% by 2019).7    
Dreamstime is a consumer in the online search advertising market, and the 
allegations herein regarding Google’s manipulation of Dreamstime’s and its 
competitors’ AdWords campaigns is both a breach of contract and a basis for 
Google’s antitrust liability with respect to this relevant market. 
31. Though the online search market and online search advertising markets 
are described separately for the sake of precision, and though the online search 
advertising market is the relevant antitrust market for purposes of this case, they are 
essentially one and the same, and Google’s monopoly power exists in both.  In 
essence, Google is monetizing a monopoly position in online search by selling 
advertising on top of search results.  The search function is “free” to the searcher, 
but the searcher provides extremely valuable private information about the 
searcher’s behavior when he or she conducts a search and is also subjected to 
advertising paid for by consumers of the ads such as Dreamstime.  No one would go 
to Google just to see ads, and no ads would be placed on Google without the free 
search services.  In many ways, this relationship is akin to free over-the-air sports 
programming that is monetized by commercial advertisements.  The market may be 
described as that for sports programming or for advertising within sports 
programming, but it is essentially one market.  Viewers may tune in for free to NBC 
to watch the Olympics, but NBC (largely) monetizes that experience through ads.  
The fact that the Olympics are free to watch with a digital antenna in no way 
                                                 
6 See, https://searchengineland.com/google-search-ad-revenues-271188 (last 
accessed on March 19, 2018).  
7 Id. 
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changes the fact that NBC is in the market for sports programming.  The same 
analogy applies to over-the-air free radio and print newspapers. 
32. The DOJ recognized a relevant market of online search advertising in 
fighting a proposed advertising agreement between Yahoo! and Google in 2008, 
which was abandoned on the eve of the DOJ filing an action against it.  In a press 
release dated November 5, 2008, entitled Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc. Abandon 
Their Advertising Agreement, the DOJ stated (emphasis added): 
‘The companies’ decision to abandon their agreement eliminates the 
competitive concerns identified during our investigation and 
eliminates the need to file an enforcement action,’ said Thomas O. 
Barnett, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department’s 
Antitrust Division. ‘The arrangement likely would have denied 
consumers the benefits of competition –lower prices, better service 
and greater innovation.’ 
. . . 
The Department’s investigation revealed that Internet search 
advertising and Internet search syndication are each relevant antitrust 
markets and that Google is by far the largest provider of such 
services, with shares of more than 70 percent in both markets. Yahoo! 
is by far Google’s most significant competitor in both markets, with 
combined market shares of 90 percent and 95 percent in the search 
advertising and search syndication markets, respectively . . . Had the 
companies implemented their arrangement, Yahoo!’s competition 
likely would have been blunted immediately with respect to the search 
pages that Yahoo! chose to fill with ads sold by Google rather than its 
own ads, and Yahoo! would have had significantly reduced incentives 
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to invest in areas of its search advertising business where outsourcing 
ads to Google made financial sense for Yahoo! 
33. The FTC has also recently recognized online search advertising as an 
appropriate antitrust relevant market, in the context of the merger of Google and 
traditional online display-ad marketing company, DoubleClick.  Even though the 
Google-DoubleClick merger would by some industry estimates give Google a 69% 
share of all online advertising revenues, the FTC did not challenge the merger 
because Google and DoubleClick were, in its view, in separate relevant markets.  Its 
official statement, released in December 2007, directly dismissed the argument that 
other forms of online advertising are appropriate substitutes for online search 
advertising (emphasis added):   
The evidence in this case shows that advertisers buy online 
advertising space from both search engine providers, like Google, and 
content providers (referred to as publishers in the online advertising 
business). However, the evidence in this case shows that the 
advertising space sold by search engines is not a substitute for space 
sold directly or indirectly by publishers or vice versa. Or, to put it in 
terms of merger analysis, the evidence shows that the sale of search 
advertising does not operate as a significant constraint on the prices or 
quality of other online advertising sold directly or indirectly by 
publishers or vice versa. 
. . . 
Advertisers view online content providers differently. A user’s 
visit to a particular content page may reveal some insight into that 
user’s interests. However, users visiting a content page do not declare 
their interests in the same way they do when they type in a keyword 
on a search engine. As they do in other media, advertisers wishing to 
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direct their advertising to customers based on their interests must 
decide where to place advertising after determining which websites 
are popular with the advertisers’ target customers. For example, a 
manufacturer of hybrid vehicles may purchase advertising space on an 
online magazine’s feature on climate change. 
Google, through its AdWords business, is the dominant provider 
of sponsored search advertising, and most of its online advertising 
revenue is generated by the sale of advertising space on its search 
engine results pages. DoubleClick does not sell sponsored search 
advertising. 
 . . . 
Unquestionably, Google is the most popular search engine on 
the Internet today by almost any metric.  As a result, it has a high 
market share in sponsored search advertising. 
34. Recently, on June 27, 2017, the European Commission fined Google 
€2.42 billion for “breaching EU antitrust rules” and abusing its dominance in search 
by giving an illegal advantage to its own comparison-shopping service, Google 
Shopping, and requiring it to end all anticompetitive conduct going forward.  In a 
press release shortly after the ruling, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager stated: 
“Google's strategy for its comparison shopping service wasn't just about attracting 
customers by making its product better than those of its rivals.  Instead, Google 
abused its market dominance as a search engine by promoting its own comparison 
shopping service in its search results, and demoting those of competitors.”  The 
press release further explained (emphasis in original): 
From 2008, Google began to implement in European markets a 
fundamental change in strategy to push its comparison shopping 
service.  This strategy relied on Google's dominance in general internet 
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search, instead of competition on the merits in comparison shopping 
markets: 
• Google has systematically given prominent placement to its 
own comparison shopping service: when a consumer enters a 
query into the Google search engine in relation to which 
Google's comparison shopping service wants to show results, 
these are displayed at or near the top of the search results. 
• Google has demoted rival comparison shopping services in its 
search results: rival comparison shopping services appear in 
Google's search results on the basis of Google's generic search 
algorithms. Google has included a number of criteria in these 
algorithms, as a result of which rival comparison shopping 
services are demoted. Evidence shows that even the most highly 
ranked rival service appears on average only on page four of 
Google's search results, and others appear even further down. 
Google's own comparison shopping service is not subject to 
Google's generic search algorithms, including such demotions. 
As a result, Google's comparison shopping service is much more 
visible to consumers in Google's search results, whilst rival comparison 
shopping services are much less visible. 
The Commission found that “Google is dominant in general internet search 
markets throughout the European Economic Area,” and that “[t]here are also 
high barriers to entry in these markets, in part because of network effects: the 
more consumers use a search engine, the more attractive it becomes to 
advertisers . . . Similarly, the data a search engine gathers about consumers 
can in turn be used to improve results.”  Finally, the Commission concluded 
that “Google has abused this market dominance by giving its own comparison 
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shopping service an illegal advantage.”  Google Images is remarkably similar 
to the Google Shopping service at issue in the European Union.  The two 
screenshots attached as Exhibit “B” hereto compare the Google Shopping 
service that was prohibited in the European Union with the Google Images 
service at issue in this case. 
35. States Attorneys General have also begun investigations of 
Google in recent months.  On November 13, 2017, Missouri Attorney General 
Josh Hawley issued an investigative demand to Google seeking “to determine 
if Google has violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. . .and 
Missouri’s antitrust laws.”8  According to its press release, the attorney 
general’s office was investigating, among other things, “Google’s alleged 
manipulation of search results to preference websites owned by Google and to 
demote websites that compete with Google.”9  In a Fortune article covering 
the investigation, Missouri AG Hawley is quoted as saying that “substantial 
evidence exists” that Google is manipulating its core search service to list its 
own Google-websites higher in search results.10  An online Wired magazine 
article dated November 14, 2017, suggests that more state investigations are 
likely to follow Missouri’s lead.11  
  
                                                 
8 See, Press Release dated November 13, 2017, 
https://www.ago.mo.gov/home/breaking-news/ag-hawley-issues-investigative-
demands-to-google-inc-. (last accessed March 19, 2018). 
9 (Id.) 
10 See, http://fortune.com/2017/11/13/google-missouri-attorney-general-
investigation/ (last accessed March 19, 2018).  
11 See, https://www.wired.com/story/state-attorneys-general-are-googles-next-
headache/ (last accessed on March 19, 2018). 
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36. In its 2016 Annual Report, Google discloses: 
The Comision Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia in Argentina, 
the Competition Commission of India (CCI), Brazil’s Council for 
Economic Defense (CADE), the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) 
of the Russian Federation, and the Korean Fair Trade Commission have 
also opened investigations into certain of our business practices. In 
November 2016, we responded to the CCI Director General’s report 
with interim findings of competition law infringements regarding 
search and ads. In September 2015, FAS found that there has been a 
competition law infringement in Android mobile distribution. The 
appeal against that decision has so far been rejected, so Google has 
implemented the ruling to the degree possible and is working on 
product changes to finalize implementation. The appeals process 
continues. In April 2016, the Canadian Competition Bureau informed 
us that it was closing its antitrust investigations of our business 
practices. 
 3. Google Maintains and Abuses its Monopoly in the Online 
Search Advertising Market to Cause Harm to Competition in 
Related Dependent Businesses 
37. While Google’s original, famous search engine was essential to its 
initial success, it has exponentially expanded on that success by acquiring 
competing search engines, online advertising entities, mobile technologies, video 
sharing technologies and platforms, social media and gaming communities and 
artificial intelligence companies at an extraordinarily high rate.  As of December 
2016, Google or its parent, Alphabet, Inc., had acquired over 200 companies, while 
only divesting itself of four of these companies.  Google has exploited ownership of 
the proprietary technologies acquired along with those companies, as well as their 
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user bases and networks, by integrating them into its increasingly vast and 
increasingly more dominant position in online search, advertising, e-commerce and 
mobile devices. 
38. By so doing, Google has progressively and synergistically increased its 
market power in innumerable related or downstream businesses in those fields, 
giving it the power to dictate not only economic and compensation rules on those 
businesses but also to manipulate the very content made available to Internet users, 
both directly and indirectly.  At an October 31, 2017 hearing of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee where members of the Committee grilled executives from Google and 
other large tech companies concerning the ways their platforms were manipulated 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Republican Senator John Kennedy 
expressed concern about these companies’ “breathtaking” influence: “[y]our power 
sometimes scares me.”12  
4. Dreamstime Is a Consumer in the Online Search Advertising 
Market and a Competitor in the Online Stock Photography 
Business 
39.  In addition to its standing as a consumer and participant in the online 
search advertising market, Dreamstime has been injured in and competes in the 
online stock photography business which is defined for purposes of this action as the 
online business of selling and distributing licensed digital images and includes 
market participants such as Dreamstime, Shutterstock, Getty Images, Adobe and 
other smaller competitors.  Shutterstock, Getty Images and Adobe together control 
the bulk of the online stock photography business.  Along with Dreamstime, these 
participants comprise a highly concentrated industry.  As described on 
                                                 
12 See, https://www.fastcompany.com/40489793/senators-grill-facebook-twitter-
google-on-fake-news-your-power-scares-me (last accessed March 19, 2018).  
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Shutterstock’s website, “stock photos are images that anyone can license for creative 
use.  Rather than hire a photographer, designers can search a large database of 
photos and quickly find one that works for their project.”13  Shutterstock’s website 
also describes the crucial role that Internet search engines play in the online stock 
photograph market: “[t]oday, Internet search engines allow anyone to find the 
perfect stock photo in seconds.”14  Getty Images’ CEO, in announcing its 
partnership with Google, cited its own “market leading” position and the fact that 
the partnership is likely to increase its dominant position: “We will license our 
market leading content to Google, working closely with them to improve attribution 
of our contributors’ work and thereby growing the ecosystem.”  
40. So-called “vertical search” websites (websites with a search function 
that are “downstream” from search engines like Google), including stock photo 
websites, pose an existential threat to Google’s monopoly in the online search 
advertising market.  Like other “vertical search” websites, stock photo websites are 
repository sites, places where a consumer can go directly to search for millions of 
images, instead of starting with Google or Google Images. If they gained sufficient 
brand recognition and awareness, most consumers would know the primary stock 
photo URLs by heart (like they know amazon.com or yelp.com by heart) and could 
start there to search for stock photos, skipping Google as a middle step.  This 
“cutting out the middleman” takes away searches from Google, which of course 
then takes away search advertising revenue from Google, because every search pulls 
up AdWords results that increase Google’s online search advertising 
monopoly.  Google Images would be devastated if more consumers knew they could 
go to Dreamstime, Getty Images, Adobe or Shutterstock directly instead of going to 
                                                 
13 See, www.shutterstock.com/support/articles/en_US/kbat01/What-are-stock-
photos. (last accessed on March 19, 2018). 
14 Id.  
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Google first.  Then, these dominant stock photo sites could start expanding their 
offerings to include other things people search for to buy.  This is exactly what 
Amazon and Yelp have done to some degree.  As noted below, one important way 
that Google keeps this from happening is partnering with some competitors and 
excluding others like Dreamstime (a lower cost competitor) that threaten its 
monopoly of online search advertising.  This gives Google more control over (and 
information about) what the dominant stock photo websites are doing, which allows 
it to prevent them from supplanting Google as the place to search for images on the 
Internet. 
41. Google has long recognized the importance of “vertical search” threats 
like stock photography repositories to its search dominance, and the FTC also 
recognized this threat in its prior investigations of Google.  As an article in 
International Business Times entitled “Google Faces Threats From Amazon, Yelp, 
Retailers As Search Goes Mobile”15 reported: 
The search wars are back on, but this time it's different . . . 
Google also faces the challenge of competing against Amazon, Yelp 
and many other services that threaten to eat into its market with 
specialized or vertical search engines. 
This threat to Google’s business has been around for years, but 
it was thrust back into the spotlight this week after documents from 
the Federal Trade Commission were revealed showing just how much 
the Mountain View, California, tech titan fears vertical search 
engines. 
                                                 
15 See, http://www.ibtimes.com/google-faces-threats-amazon-yelp-retailers-
search-goes-mobile-1861968. (last accessed March 19, 2018). 
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Specialized search engines ‘might cause users to shift their 
searches in those categories away from Google's general Web search 
platform. As users moved to vertical search websites, those websites 
could, in turn, become more attractive vehicles for advertisers, thus 
resulting in potentially significant revenue losses to Google,’ the FTC 
documents, which were obtained by the Wall Street Journal, said. 
This fear for Google is more pressing than ever. . . 
42. Dreamstime is one of the leaders among online stock photography 
repositories and has been a reliable supplier of high quality digital images since 
2000.  Dreamstime is a repository of millions of high quality stock images.  It serves 
a variety of clients in the creative market, from independent private sector customers 
to Fortune 100 companies.  As of March 2018, Dreamstime had 20,000,000 
registered members, more than 400,000 contributing photographers and over 
75,000,000 photos, illustrations, clip arts, and vectors.  
43. Dreamstime conducts its business through its website and mobile 
applications, through which customers can choose from millions of high quality 
digital photographs, videos and illustrations sold by hundreds of thousands of 
contributing photographers. 
44. Dreamstime has worked diligently for almost two decades to establish 
itself as a leader in online stock photography.  Like all its competitors in the online 
stock photography business, Dreamstime relies heavily upon online search engines 
and search engine advertising to build its name recognition and generate new 
customers and sales.  Like most modern stock photography companies, 
Dreamstime’s business is conducted exclusively through the Internet and web-based 
applications.  As much as 99% of Dreamstime’s business comes from the Internet.  
As such, search engines are a critical component of Dreamstime’s sales and 
customer acquisition strategy.  Roughly two-thirds of Dreamstime’s customers find 
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their way to the website from a search-engine search.  Even customers with active 
Dreamstime accounts will often conduct a Google search for “Dreamstime” 
(sometimes along with other search terms) instead of typing “Dreamstime.com” in 
their browser address bar. 
45. High barriers to entry exist in the online stock photography business.  
Among other things, the major players in this industry all possess vast repositories 
of digital images for consumers to search for and license.  Shutterstock’s website 
boasts over 183 million images; Getty Images has an archive of over 80 million still 
images and illustrations and more than 50,000 hours of stock film footage; and 
Adobe claims “millions” of available images.  Hosting these images and making 
them available on websites requires significant computing power and engineering.  
Moreover, existing online stock photography companies employ vast networks of 
contributors to build their library of digital images.  Like many Internet-based 
companies, these companies take advantage of network effects whereby a product or 
service gains additional value as more people use it.  Network effects create the 
most significant barrier to entry, because photographers only want to license their 
photos to websites that already attract a large number of potential purchasers.  
Adobe was the most recent major player to enter the online stock photograph 
business in 2015, and it was only able to enter the business because of extraordinary, 
“one of a kind” advantages peculiar to it: Adobe is the publisher of popular image-
editing software available through their “Creative Cloud Interface.”  Adobe found 
that 85% of creative professionals who purchase stock photography used their 
software products and that 90% of all stock photography was edited using their 
software.  Adobe integrated its online stock photograph business directly into its 
Creative Cloud interface, which links directly with any Adobe program currently 
accessing a user’s image library.  Even with these advantages, Adobe had recently 
captured only 2.62% of the market for online stock photography.  Like the 
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Microsoft example in online search, the Adobe example illustrates the significant 
barriers to entry in the online stock photography business.  It is worth noting that 
this was Adobe’s third attempt at entering this business segment.  Adobe had 
previously paid $800 million to purchase Fotolia, one of Dreamstime’s competitors. 
5. Google Restricts and Distorts Competition in Online Stock 
Photography Through Its Deals with Shutterstock and Getty 
Images 
46. On July 12, 2016, Shutterstock publicly announced a licensing 
agreement between it and Google.16  Among other things, the deal provides 
advertisers with access to Shutterstock’s library of online images to use with their 
advertisements running through Google’s AdSense, AdWords and AdMob 
platforms.  The day after the deal was announced, Shutterstock’s stock price rose 
14.2%.   On information and belief, the licensing agreement allows Google to 
receive revenue from the licensing of Shutterstock’s online stock photographs, 
thereby making Google a participant in the online stock photograph business.  On 
information and belief, the licensing agreement calls for Shutterstock to share user 
data with Google, which allows Google to maintain its monopoly in the online 
search advertising market. 
47.  Google also plans to enter the online stock photography business 
segment directly and is currently using its Google Images service to disrupt the 
market for stock photos and eliminate (or at least significantly impair) competition 
in that line of commerce.  One way that Google caused anticompetitive effects in the 
online stock photography business until very recently was by way of its “view 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Sullivan, Laurie. “Google, Shutterstock, Licensing Deal 
Automatically Chooses Images For Ads” available at 
https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/280120/google-shutterstock-
licensing-deal-automatically.html (last accessed on March 19, 2018). 
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image” button that appeared when a user clicked on an image returned by a Google 
search.  Clicking on this button allowed a user to open and save the image directly.  
The view image button encouraged and enabled users to steal copyrighted 
photographs from photographers, publishers and online stock photography 
companies, including Dreamstime.  The button allowed users to bypass the websites 
from which Google obtained the image and provided the image directly to the user.  
To make matters worse, Google provided users with high resolution copies of these 
images, which made it even easier and more desirable for users to download and 
save images without visiting their website of origin.  Of course, by bypassing the 
original website, Google users were not exposed to relevant copyright and 
ownership information available on the websites from which the images originated.  
The “view image” button took business away from Dreamstime and other stock 
photography companies: users often took and used images from Dreamstime 
without ever visiting its site.  This often resulted in an infringement of the image’s 
copyright and prevented the user from purchasing the image from Dreamstime or 
being exposed to Dreamstime’s website and its many other stock photograph 
offerings.  On February 15, 2018, it was reported that Google was removing its 
“view image” button to encourage users to visit the website that hosts the image.17  
The article notes that “the intention seems to be either stopping people from taking 
an image altogether or driving them through to the website where the image is 
found, so that the website can serve ads and get revenue and so that people are more 
likely to get copyright information.”18  Just one week after Google removed this 
button, Dreamstime experienced a 25% increase in traffic to its website and 10% 
increase in conversion – proving that Google’s past conduct with the “view image” 
                                                 
17 See, https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/15/17017864/google-removes-view-
image-button-from-search-results. (last accessed on March 19, 2018). 
18 Id. 
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button stole traffic and customers from Dreamstime.  The button no doubt was 
popular with some Google users who wanted to easily obtain copyrighted images for 
free, increasing the popularity of Google’s search engine.  To this day, however, 
searchers are still able to access high-resolution images that show up in Google 
Images searches by right-clicking and saving the image.  These images are still of a 
high enough resolution for desktop and mobile screens as to allow abuses to occur.  
Google has taken its empowerment of would-be infringers even further, by creating 
and distributing a script that removes watermarks from images (watermarks are one 
means by which a copyright owner prevents unauthorized use of an image).   
48.   In or around the first week of February 2018, Google and Getty 
Images announced a “multi-year global licensing partnership, enabling Google to 
use Getty Images’ content within its various products and services.”19  That deal 
“effectively” ended a copyright and antitrust dispute filed by Getty Images in the 
European Union in 2016 involving Google Image’s use of high-resolution images 
“scraped” from Getty Images’ and/or its customers’ websites.  Ironically, Google 
may have partnered with Getty Images to avoid antitrust liability in the European 
Union at the same time as the “partnership” furthers its ability to control and restrict 
trade in the online stock photography business.  Because this partnership is in its 
nascent stages, little measure of the effects it will likely have on the online stock 
photography business is available (though Getty Images has at times received an 
even higher rank than Shutterstock since the deal).  On information and belief, the 
licensing agreement allows Google to receive revenue from the licensing of Getty 
Image’s online stock photographs, thereby making Google a participant in the online 
stock photograph business.  On information and belief, the licensing agreement calls 
                                                 
19 See, www.searchengineland.com/google-getty-images-enter-multi-year-global-
licensing-partnership-291831. (last accessed on March 19, 2018). 
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for Getty Images to share user data with Google, which allows Google to maintain 
its monopoly in the online search advertising market. 
6. Google Abuses Its Monopoly Power in Online Search 
Advertising to Harm and Competitively Disadvantage Its 
Consumer, Dreamstime, in the Online Stock Photography 
Business  
49. Google wields its market power in online search advertising 
discriminatorily by giving some participants in downstream dependent businesses 
higher search rankings while lowering the search rankings of others to the point that 
they become invisible.  Google’s apparent purpose is to exclude competition, 
increase Shutterstock’s (its partner/proxy’s) and Getty Images’ (its partner/proxy’s) 
market power and reduce consumer choice, while at the same time maximizing the 
AdWords revenue Google derives from other large competitors that have significant 
AdWords campaigns.  When Dreamstime is gone, Shutterstock’s and Getty Images’ 
dominant positions will be solidified, and Google will be able to eliminate still other 
large competitors, starting with those who spend the least on its profitable AdWords 
services.   
50. Here is how this works in practice:  Google discriminates in the online 
search market by rigging its search engine algorithm to unfairly privilege its 
partners, Shutterstock and Getty Images, and to essentially exclude Dreamstime 
from organic search results for stock photography.  The only other significant stock 
photo website that is not a partner of Google’s and that may have benefited 
marginally from Google’s exclusion of Dreamstime and other competitors is Adobe.  
Google derives large profits from online advertising purchased by Adobe, creating 
significant costs in the short term for it to eliminate Adobe.  In addition, Google is 
aware that eliminating all competitors besides Shutterstock and Getty Images at 
once would draw more obvious antitrust scrutiny.  Indeed, Google’s search engine 
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might lose all credibility if it were to return no relevant searches for stock 
photography other than Google Images, Shutterstock, Getty Images and their 
wholly-owned websites.  For the most part, Adobe stays on the first page of organic 
search results, but it does not generally rank ahead of Shutterstock and Getty Images 
or receive the other benefits unique to Shutterstock described herein (e.g., 
“knowledge graphs,” at Exhibit “A”).   
51. Google has also elevated the search ranking of various websites 
containing only public domain images and other “Junk Websites,” defined for 
purposes of this lawsuit as results responsive to search terms related to online stock 
photographs that are of low relevance to customers searching for sources of 
licensable digital images.  Google’s promotion of Junk Websites can only have an 
anticompetitive purpose and effect, because these sites knock Dreamstime out of 
view for the consumer googling for stock photography but do not promote viable 
alternatives in the process.  
52.  While Google has focused many of its efforts on Dreamstime (so far), 
Dreamstime is not the only competitor that has been excluded from organic search 
results in this fashion.  Google has also intentionally altered its algorithm to harm 
other similarly-situated competitors, including 123RF, DepositPhotos, and 
CanStockPhoto, who all suffered inexplicable drops in organic search rankings.   
53.   In sum, Google has altered its search algorithm – or, at least, how that 
algorithm was applied to Dreamstime and others – to unfairly exclude Dreamstime 
and others in the online stock photography business and to favor Google’s own 
services and those of Shutterstock and/or Getty Images,20 providing an unearned and 
                                                 
20 Adobe may also benefit marginally in the intermediate term as an indirect 
consequence of Dreamstime’s exclusion.  However, it too risks harm in the long 
term when Google takes further advantage of its own Google Images, Shutterstock’s 
and Getty Images’ increased market power to exclude it.  
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crucial advantage to Shutterstock and Getty Images over Dreamstime and others.  In 
the process, many Junk Websites populate Google’s search results, diminishing the 
consumer experience, and increasing the likelihood that consumers are directed to 
Shutterstock and Getty Images (or to Google Images, Google’s own service). 
54. Google’s maintenance and abuse of its online search advertising 
monopoly to restrict and distort competition for online stock photography has 
benefited Google directly, and has also benefited its partners Shutterstock and Getty 
Images.  For example, Google’s market power in the online search advertising 
market has allowed it to extract supracompetitive advertising premiums from its 
customers because it is not required to compete on price.  That is, most of the 
commercial websites ranked by Google are also customers of Google’s online 
advertising services.  Those websites that are pushed to the bottom of the search 
rankings, as Dreamstime has been, are forced to increase their reliance (and 
spending) on Google online advertising services to drive customers to their website 
and generate business.  In the past, when Dreamstime’s search ranking more 
accurately reflected its relevance to online stock photography, Dreamstime did not 
need to spend as extravagantly on its paid advertising on search results pages.  The 
elimination of Dreamstime from organic search results in turn allows Google to 
maintain its monopoly power over online search advertising by eliminating an 
important “vertical search” threat to its search dominance. 
55. Google has long been accused of exactly this kind of discriminatory, 
anticompetitive manipulation of its search engine.  In a Senate hearing on Google in 
September 2011, Jeff Katz, CEO of Nextag, Inc., complained that Google “cook[s]’ 
its algorithm … rigging its results, biasing [search results] in favor of [itself.]”  The 
downstream business for online stock photography is one of several dependent 
businesses that have been injured through Google’s maintenance and improper use 
of its online search advertising market power, injuring its customer Dreamstime and 
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giving it standing to bring these antitrust claims.  This conduct, in turn, harms 
consumers of online stock photographs, by eliminating millions of images from their 
available choices in that online industry.  This industry is at the very foundation of 
online advertising because it provides high quality images to integrate into 
advertisements. 
56.  By favoring its own additional services in downstream businesses (that 
are dependent on Google’s online search services) through its monopoly of the 
online search advertising market, Google both pressures current competitors in the 
downstream businesses to exit their businesses as well as increases the cost (or 
makes it impossible) for additional competitors to enter those marketplaces.  For 
example, in Senate testimony of September 2011, Yelp CEO Jeremy Stoppelman 
indicated that “there’s no way” he would have started Yelp, or a business using a 
similar strategy, if Google had been engaging in the favored placement of its own 
services in the way that has become Google’s routine.   
B. Google Engages in Predatory, Discriminatory, and Anticompetitive   
Conduct to Maintain and Exploit its Monopoly 
57. Google has injured competition in the online business in which 
Dreamstime competes, online stock photography, through the discriminatory use of 
its monopoly power in the online search advertising market, excluding Dreamstime 
(a consumer of Google’s search advertising services) and other online stock 
photography competitors from all common searches for stock photography.  As 
described below, Google has engaged, and continues to engage, in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct directed at accomplishing its unlawful goal of preserving its 
monopoly and harming competition downstream for its economic benefit.  
Ultimately, consumers are harmed because Dreamstime, as a large supplier of 
unique, high-quality stock photo images – one that otherwise would exert downward 
pricing pressure on a dominant market player like Shutterstock or Getty Images – 
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has essentially become invisible to consumers.  In fact, one of Dreamstime’s most 
important unique selling points that differentiates its stock photography offerings 
from other competitors like Shutterstock and Getty Images is its competitive pricing.  
Most of Dreamstime’s customers view its pricing as Dreamstime’s most important 
distinguishing feature over other online stock photography competitors.21 
1. Google’s Monopoly Abuse and Exploitation Has Restricted 
Competition for Stock Photography Directly and Through 
Its Partners/Proxies Shutterstock and Getty Images 
58. Google, through its partner/proxies, Shutterstock and Getty Images, and 
buttressed by its unlawful Google Images practices, has restricted competition 
among stock photography repository websites (which, in turn, eliminates a “vertical 
search” threat to Google’s search advertising dominance).  Shutterstock and Getty 
Images currently control a dominant share of the online stock photography industry, 
together representing close to 70% of the market.  Google’s strategy in the online 
stock photography business is transparent: using Google’s search algorithm to 
unfairly sandbag Dreamstime’s search ranking, further assisted by other 
discriminatory conduct against Dreamstime with respect to Google’s AdWords and 
Google Images.  The elimination of competition in “vertical search” websites like 
those allowing for direct stock photography searches enhances Google’s online 
search advertising monopoly. 
59.  The Shutterstock and Getty Images contracts are opportunities for 
Google to collect more user data and play into the self-reinforcing strength of 
                                                 
21 Because Dreamstime has lost so much traffic after Google downgraded its 
search ranking and because of its increased costs due to the necessity of countering 
Google’s tactics by increasing its Google AdWords spending, Dreamstime may 
soon have to raise its prices and risk losing one of its key advantages over larger 
online stock photography companies.   
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Google’s search advertising platform as it gathers more data compared to rivals.  Or 
as Jonathan Rosenberg, Google’s own VP of Product Management and Marketing, 
explained in an unguarded statement in 2008: 
We get more users because we have more advertisers because we can 
buy distribution on sites that understand that our search engine 
monetizes better.  So more users more information, more information 
more users, more advertisers more users, it’s a beautiful thing, lather, 
rinse, repeat, that’s what I do for a living. So that’s . . . the engine that 
can’t be stopped.22 
Its control over user data creates enormous barriers to entry and unique 
competitive advantages for Google that increase its monopoly power with 
every partnership it enters.  In fact, multiple countries have accused Google 
of (and sanctioned it for) unlawful mining of user data through various 
platforms and arrangements, including but not limited to Google Maps, 
Android phones, and alliances with other partners.  In a recent Yale Journal 
on Regulation article entitled “Search, Antitrust, And the Economics Of The 
Control Of User Data” (31 Yale J. on Reg. 401, 435-440), Nathan Newman 
stated: “Beyond entrenching its monopoly on search advertising by 
expanding into new online markets to control new user data, Google has 
even more directly used its market power to coerce allies in ways that fortify 
its position and engaged in flatly illegal activities to reinforce its control of 
user data.”  As spelled out in the Newman article (at pages 435-440), Google 
                                                 
22 Press Release, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal Continues to Press 
Google on Market Power and Competition Policy. See, 
https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-continues-
to-press-google-on-market-power-and-competition-policy- (last accessed on March 
19, 2018). 
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has engaged in unlawful conduct that violates privacy or consumer fraud 
laws, all in the interest of maintaining and enhancing its dominance in 
gathering, organizing, and reselling private information.  The use of that 
private information in turn enhances Google’s revenues and its monopoly in 
the online search advertising market. 
60. In connection with the DoubleClick merger investigation, the FTC 
stated: “The popularity of Google’s search engine and its technical prowess already 
give Google abundant customer information even pre-transaction.” 
61. Google wields monopoly power in the online search advertising market 
through its ability to control prices or destroy competition.  It abuses that power by 
discriminating and restraining trade in the online stock photography business, a 
“vertical search” business that threatens Google’s monopoly.  Google manipulates 
this competition for its own benefit.  As described above, it chooses winners in the 
online stock photography industry.  This has a two-fold benefit for Google: (a) it 
increases its revenue both through its partnership with Shutterstock and Getty 
Images and through the increase in advertising revenue it derives from excluded 
websites; and (b) it allows Google to maintain its monopoly power in the online 
search advertising market.  Google profits from having arrangements with 
dependent dominant downstream parties because it ensures it will receive the 
revenue from the party it has helped gain dominant downstream market share.  
Google maintains and even enhances its monopoly by creating downstream 
arrangements, like the ones it has with Shutterstock and Getty Images.  In exchange, 
Google need only alter its search algorithm (essentially a low-cost undertaking) to 
promote Shutterstock’s and Getty Images’ rankings and downgrade Dreamtime’s 
and others’ rankings.  A non-discriminatory application of Google’s search 
algorithm would result in Google losing a significant amount of revenue from 
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Shutterstock and Getty Images (as well as its own Google Images) and would foster 
healthy and fair competition among these websites. 
62.   Shutterstock, one source of Google’s revenue derived from online 
stock photography, was recently the second result when a user searched for the 
terms “stock photography” in Google’s search engine.  The website Wikipedia – 
which is commonly known to be a non-commercial, encyclopedic reference website 
– ranked first in this search.  In other words, Shutterstock was the first commercial 
entity ranked on a search for “stock photography.”  A knowledge graph also 
appeared below the first search result very high on the page and the first question in 
that knowledge graph is “are there free images on Shutterstock” – none of the other 
three questions in the knowledge graph mentioned any stock photography company 
by name.  Getty Images also ranked highly in Google’s search results (typically in 
the first two or three) and, through various special arrangements with Google, is 
likely to enjoy even greater organic search visibility for its images after its licensing 
agreement with Google.  Adobe ranked fourth.  Other Junk Websites or public 
domain images websites (which are not stock photography websites) round out the 
top 10.   
63. In a recent Google search for “stock photos,” iStock (owned by Getty 
Images) and Shutterstock ranked prominently and consistently in the top five.  
Shutterstock’s website, Bigstock, was also in the top 10.  Of the top 10 results, only 
iStock (owned by Getty Images), Shutterstock, Bigstock (owned by Shutterstock) 
and Adobe are online stock photograph competitors – that is, in the crucial first page 
of Google search results, the only stock photography competitors are Shutterstock, 
Getty Images and Adobe. 
64. Dreamstime, for so long a standard denizen of the valuable top three 
search results for this particular search, is generally not even found on the first 20 
pages of results.  Other competitors have suffered a similar fate.  
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2. Google Has Engaged in Additional Anticompetitive Conduct 
in Furtherance of Its Maintenance and Abuse of its Online 
Search Advertising Monopoly 
65. Google also has a policy against duplicative content.  Pursuant to that 
policy, Google prevents substantive blocks of content within or across domains that 
either completely match other content or are appreciably similar.  In furtherance of 
its maintenance and abuse of its monopoly in the online search advertising market to 
restrain and control online stock photography competition, however, Google now 
selectively enforces this rule to Dreamstime’s detriment.  As mentioned above, 
Dreamstime’s competitors Shutterstock and Bigstock are stock photo retailers 
owned by the same provider.  They offer the same images for license under two 
different domains without any appreciable difference, yet they both recently 
appeared as the first and second individual results when searching for the phrase 
“stock photo.”  As a result, Shutterstock would generally receive at least 50% of the 
Google traffic for the search term “stock photos.”  As shown in Exhibit “C” attached 
hereto, Google inexplicably includes as many as three to five links to the same site 
on its first page of search results, further pushing Dreamstime (and others) down in 
results that become less and less useful to potential customers.  In fact, there are 
some searches where only a single site is displayed on a whole page of results (i.e., 
10 out of 10 spots), which further demotes Dreamstime.  See Exhibit “D”.  These 
results violate Google’s own policy of allowing only two links from the same 
website owner (a policy that was intended to ensure diverse results). 
66. Google’s “support” services offered to companies further its anti-
competitive scheme.  After Dreamstime sought answers from Google regarding its 
dramatic plunge in organic search ranking, Google refused to substantively discuss 
Dreamstime’s search ranking or provide any rational justification for Dreamstime’s 
unfavorable ranking.  When asked via Google’s support forum (the place where 
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Google insists that companies must go to ask for assistance) about Dreamstime’s 
ranking, Google’s representatives have responded with sarcastic and dismissive non-
advice to questions about how such low-quality results can wind up so high in 
organic search results.   
67. As an example of this behavior of dismissing Dreamstime’s concerns 
about Google’s search ranking policies, Exhibit “E” depicts a screen capture of a 
forum discussion wherein a user is asking Google why a site ranks so highly for the 
general search term “stock photos” when the site’s main domain is permanently set 
to redirect users to another page deep within the indexed site’s hierarchy (i.e., a 
specific page listing images that match the more specific search string “christmas 
images”).  In other words, the site in question employed a “hacking” technique to 
artificially increase its search ranking – a practice that is purportedly against 
Google’s policies.  This example presented in the forum post involved a site called 
StockPhoto.com that ranked ahead of Dreamstime in Google search results.  
Clicking on the StockPhoto.com link in Google’s search results, rather than taking 
users to the homepage of StockPhoto.com, redirected users to the page 
https://stockphoto.com/search/listen+to+music – which displays only a very narrow 
subset of images that are not very useful to a potential customer searching for “stock 
photos.”  This would be akin to searching for the broad category “electronics,” 
selecting a top result to click on, and being sent to a page that only provided 
information about 8-track tape players.  Rather than acknowledging a problem with 
the search results or volunteering substantive fixes for such a situation, John Muller, 
an executive on Google’s organic search team, responded to the forum question by 
suggesting that site owners who rank below the offending site should “ask them” 
why they would use a redirect on their homepage.  This infuriating level of non-
support is indicative of Google’s attitude toward any company whom Google has 
not selected as a partner. 
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68. Since early 2016, Dreamstime has followed every guideline and 
suggestion provided by Google’s documentation, as well as many other suggestions 
by external SEO agencies, in an effort to resolve the damage to its organic search 
ranking.  Nothing has changed.  In fact, Dreamstime’s ranking continued to decline 
through the end of 2017.  At Google’s recommendation, Dreamstime has 
implemented a bevy of changes, including: switching to https and http2; disavowing 
links; improving its website quality, diversity, and quantity of content; investing in 
dedicated hardware for a caching system; and dramatically increasing its crawl rate 
(10 times) and number of pages.  At Google’s suggestion, Dreamstime invested 
numerous development hours in rebuilding its entire site to be “mobile friendly,” 
because it was claimed that Dreamstime’s search rank might be hurt by failing to 
have a site that worked on cell phones.  Dreamstime diverted precious 
development resources from other projects in its business plan and doubled its 
hosting costs, all to no avail.  These “suggestions” were nothing more than cover for 
Google’s anticompetitive search bias scheme.  These suggestions could not possibly 
alter Dreamstime’s ranking, were intended to waste Dreamstime’s resources and 
time, and disguised Google’s intentional manipulation of Dreamstime’s ranking 
algorithm.  Dreamstime expended significant resources and time to implement these 
suggestions and in fact undertook an entire re-design of its website in an ultimately 
futile attempt to regain the ground it lost in Google’s organic search. 
69. Dreamstime paid several expensive search engine “guru” firms for their 
analysis and opinion of why Dreamstime’s Google search ranking might be 
declining, and not a single one was able to identify any issue with Dreamstime’s site 
that would explain its drop in Google’s search ranking.  Based on Google’s public 
guidelines about how its search worked, Dreamstime spent millions of dollars on 
website hosting to increase the content on its website by adding more images.  
These efforts failed to regain its lost ranking.  In addition, Dreamstime hired its own 
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in-house SEO expert to help its efforts to regain its prior search ranking.  Like the 
outside search engine gurus, this experienced professional was unable to identify 
any issues with Dreamstime’s site that would explain how Dreamstime came to be 
excluded from Google’s search ranking.  Dreamstime also launched a second 
website, Megapixl.com, to get more exposure for a subset of its content (just as 
Shutterstock launched a sister website Offset.com, which contained a subset of its 
content).  Dreamstime also spent substantial sums on AdWords campaigns for 
Megapixl.com.  Despite Dreamstime’s significant investment in infrastructure and 
advertising for Megapixl.com, that website was unable to gain traction in organic 
search and Dreamstime was only able to recover a fraction of its investment.  All 
told, Dreamstime spent several million dollars hiring search professionals, building 
out and launching AdWords campaigns for a second website, expanding the content 
on its primary site and increasing its AdWords budget. 
70. To combat the losses resulting from its effective exclusion from 
Google’s organic search results, Dreamstime was at first forced to spend 
considerably more on search engine advertising to maintain its position as a leader 
in online stock photography.23  This meant increased spending on advertising 
services including Google’s AdWords.  The increased reliance on paid search results 
in turn diminished Dreamstime’s competitive standing.  Of course, it also benefitted 
Google directly. 
71. Dreamstime is unaware of any innocuous explanation for its dramatic 
decline in search ranking – nothing about its website or how customers use its 
                                                 
23 After dramatically increasing its ad spend and implementing extensive changes 
recommended by Google to help with search ranking, Dreamstime recently resolved 
to significantly lower its advertising spending, as its advertising spending did not 
come close to compensating for the loss of traffic caused by Google’s search bias 
campaign. 
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website explain its decline in stock photography searches (and Google has never 
cited any such innocent reason in the course of Dreamstime’s efforts to address the 
issue with Google).  If anything, Dreamstime has improved in all of the metrics that 
Google claims are important to search ranking.  During the relevant period (2014-
2017), Dreamstime’s user engagement has improved over time.  Its “bounce rate” (a 
metric that indicates that percentage of people who land on a web page and then 
leave without clicking anywhere else on the website) has declined over time while 
the average amount of time users have spent on Dreamstime’s website has stayed 
basically constant.  Dreamstime’s page load times have also decreased dramatically 
since Fall of 2015 when the issues with its search ranking became noticeable.  
3. Google’s Discrimination Against Dreamstime Has Had 
Anticompetitive Effects 
72. Google has used various tactics and manipulated its search engine 
algorithm to illegitimately change the ranking of Dreamstime’s website (and the 
websites of other competitors) in the results page for searches related to online stock 
photography, causing the ranking of Dreamstime’s website to plummet several 
pages of search results for the most common searches.   
73. From approximately 2005 to 2015, Dreamstime consistently ranked in 
the top three in Google's organic search ranking for searches related to stock 
photography, and always appeared on the first page of the search results.  Due to 
Dreamstime’s longstanding place among the top online repositories of stock 
photographs and its status as a top five vendor of online stock photography, its 
ranking made sense.  Along with three other pioneer microstock agencies, iStock, 
Fotolia and Shutterstock, Dreamstime challenged the traditional stock photography 
agencies and were major players in the online stock photograph industry.  However, 
iStock was acquired by Getty Images, Fotolia was acquired by Adobe, and 
Shutterstock and Getty Images have partnered directly with Google – leaving 
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Dreamstime on its own as the only significant independent microstock agency left 
from these pioneering sites, despite Dreamstime’s historically large community and 
customer retention.   
74. Given its market position and the breadth and quality of its images, 
Dreamstime is undoubtedly relevant and popular to computer users that google 
online stock photographs.  Dreamstime’s historical web traffic prior to Google’s 
conduct reinforced this conclusion – its high traffic reflected that many people that 
google online stock photography ended up using and purchasing stock photographs 
from Dreamstime. 
75. Yet, since approximately August 2015, Dreamstime's organic search 
ranking on Google has inexplicably plummeted on several standard searches related 
to stock photography.  For example, from approximately 2005 to 2015, 
Dreamstime’s Google ranking for the search term “stock photos” ranked either 
second or third.  By comparison, in or around June 2017, Dreamstime plummeted to 
the fourth page for the same search term despite being in the stock 
photography business for over a decade and offering a stock photography library of 
over 70 million images.  Now, its ranking has fallen to the 20th page within the 
Google ranking. Bing and Yahoo! both rank Dreamstime as the fourth result for this 
same search term, while Baidu similarly ranks Dreamstime eighth.  Both rankings 
would generally place Dreamstime prominently on the critical first page of search 
results.  These other search engine examples illustrate that Google’s exclusion of 
Dreamstime is not due to any industry-wide change in Dreamstime’s content, users’ 
search behavior or any other rational change in circumstances.  They also 
demonstrate how Google’s dominance over search engines harms consumers, by 
eliminating choices that would otherwise widely be available. 
76. Dreamstime’s plummet in Google’s organic search ranking 
significantly reduced the number of new Dreamstime buyers, i.e., new customers 
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who sign up for Dreamstime and make a purchase within one month.  For example, 
in April 2015, before Dreamstime’s ranking drop, it gained a substantial number of 
new buyers.  In April of 2016, however, it gained 30% fewer buyers.  This steady 
decline in new buyers because of its drop in Google’s rankings has caused 
Dreamstime to lose tens of millions of dollars in potential revenue and as much as 
hundreds of millions in market value.  It is safe to assume that other downgraded 
sites (e.g., 123RF, Canstockphoto, Depositphotos) experienced a similar decline. 
Again, this result not only harms Dreamstime and other competitors, it harms 
consumers, who now may choose only from Google’s partners, Adobe or Google’s 
own Google Images section (where images are not safe to use for commercial and 
legal reasons). 
77. The same holds true for other searches related to stock photography.  
For example, Dreamstime’s organic search ranking for “stock images” was recently 
91st on Google, compared to fifth on Bing, fourth on Yahoo!, and third on Baidu.  
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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78. This graph shows Dreamstime’s position in Google search results for 
“stock photos” over the last five years, as it recently dropped from third to 91st. 
 
79. Of crucial importance is Dreamstime’s drop from page one of Google’s 
rankings to page two (and recently as far as page 20 and below).  According to 
research by respected online ad network Chitika, 92% of all Google search traffic is 
limited to the first page of the results, with the top three results receiving 61% of the 
clicks.  When moving from page one to two, the traffic drops by 95%.  For almost 
ten years, Dreamstime ranked in the top two to three in the key search for the terms 
“stock photos” (far and away the most important search for online stock 
photography due to the number of users searching for these terms).  By relegating 
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Dreamstime to the 20th or lower page in Google’s search, Google has effectively 
banished Dreamstime from the marketplace.  
80. This decline in Dreamstime’s organic search ranking does not bear any 
relationship to Dreamstime’s overall organic visibility, which improved over the 
same period of time.  Google intentionally altered its search ranking algorithm’s 
functionality with respect to online stock photography searches to bolster 
Shutterstock’s and Getty Images’ search rankings and severely diminish 
Dreamstime’s ranking.  The timing of Dreamstime’s dramatic fall in Google search 
rankings, Dreamstime’s historical Google search ranking and Dreamstime’s 
continued excellent performance in non-Google search rankings confirms that 
Google altered its search rankings to exclude Dreamstime and benefit itself and its 
partners.24 
81. To push Dreamstime entirely out of view for any consumer searching 
for online stock photographs, Google inserts ahead of Dreamstime completely 
useless Junk Websites.  The low caliber of online stock photography companies that 
now rank ahead of Dreamstime in Google search results for “stock photos” 
evidences Google’s unfair and discriminatory treatment.  Dreamstime has recently 
ranked behind clearly inferior competitors including sites with only 30,000 free 
images (compared with Dreamstime’s more than 2 million free images), sites with 
only 140 images total, and multiple URLs that refer to the same photo site.  Prior to 
Google’s licensing deal with Shutterstock, these sites were never ranked ahead of 
Dreamstime in online stock photography searches, and rightfully so.  Dreamstime is 
clearly more “relevant” to “stock photos” than a blog article entitled “Stock photos 
                                                 
24 Again, the effects of Getty Images’ licensing agreement are yet to be clearly 
measured given that this agreement was only recently put into effect.  
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that don’t suck” that has not been updated since 2014.  Other less relevant websites 
that are ranked higher than Dreamstime in a search for “stock photos” include: 
• “Death to Stock” – a website that emails free photographs to users and 
has a library of just 1500 photographs; 
• Vince Vaughn and Co-stars Pose for Idiotic Stock Photos You Can 
Have Free – an article about a PR campaign for a movie released in 
2015; 
• the reddit webpage “WTF Stock Photos” that collects “unnecessary 
stock photos taken without a realistic intention of selling” for the 
amusement of the reddit online community; 
• the twitter account page for “darkstockphotos,” a twitter user that posts 
“extremely f***** up stock photography” (whose recent twitter posts 
include a photograph of a woman writing the word “help” in blood on a 
mirror and a toddler in obvious distress holding a chrome-plated nine-
millimeter semi-automatic pistol); and 
• an October 20, 2014, article by Casey Ark on the website 
entrepreneur.com titled “14 Amazingly free stock photo websites.” 
Were Google’s algorithm performing the function of ranking and distinguishing 
relevant and useful results ahead of less relevant and useful results, these sites would 
never be ranked ahead of Dreamstime.  The obvious anticompetitive purpose and 
effect of this conduct is to entirely eliminate millions of high-quality, unique stock 
photographs from a consumer’s view, and thereby eliminate a potential “vertical 
search” threat to Google’s online search advertising monopoly. 
82. Google’s treatment of Dreamstime is markedly different from Google’s 
treatment of many of Dreamstime’s largest competitors.  Through its partnership 
with Shutterstock and recently announced partnership with Getty Images, as well as 
its independent offering of images within its search results, Google has become a 
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major force in the online stock photography business, with the distinct advantage of 
controlling organic and paid searches for customers in that online industry.  
Shutterstock ranks at or very near number one in organic search ranking for “stock 
photos” on Google.  Bigstock, a website owned by Shutterstock, which carries 
almost exactly the same images as Shutterstock, also ranks in the top five on 
Google.  Additionally, as depicted in Exhibit “A,” both Shutterstock and Bigstock 
enjoy the significant benefits of “knowledge graph” entries that appear at the very 
top of organic search results for generic terms like “stock photos.”  These 
“knowledge graphs” – which according to Google are intended to show general 
information about the topic a user is searching for25 – ultimately function as free 
advertising for Google’s partners when placed alongside search results for generic 
market terms, giving unfair advantage to those partners over competitors like 
Dreamstime.  The inclusion of images (i.e., company logos) makes knowledge 
graph entries in search results and paid advertisements (all of which are plain, 
vanilla text) very noticeable and attractive to users and draws even more clicks away 
from companies who do not happen to be Google’s partner.   
83.   Similarly, Google often alerts users to the existence of competitors 
when users search for a specific brand under a “users also searched for” tag.  For 
example, when users search for the term “Dreamstime” in the search results, Google 
will inform the user that other users have searched for the term “Shutterstock.”  
However, when a user searches for “Shutterstock,” Google does not include a tag 
informing users that others had also searched for Dreamstime.  Similarly, 
Shutterstock is displayed prominently in organic search results for “dreamstime,” 
which is a result that is very difficult to achieve from traditional SEO efforts.  
                                                 
25 See, Knowledge Graph feature description, available at 
https://www.google.com/intl/es419/insidesearch/features/search/knowledge.html. 
(last accessed on March 19, 2018).  
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Again, this is a strategy to draw clicks away from Dreamstime and to divert and 
funnel those clicks to Shutterstock. 
84.   Literally any Google user can easily see how Google’s discrimination 
against Dreamstime impacts consumers.  Take, for example, the term “peppers” 
(plural). When one performs a Google Image search of the term “peppers,” the first 
100 image results are pictures of bell or jalapeno peppers.  This result provides some 
insight into Google’s algorithm – for example, the algorithm finds pictures of bell 
peppers highly relevant to the Image Search for the word “peppers.”   Below is a 
screen capture showing the first images returned for a search for the term “peppers” 
on Google Images. 
 
  
 
Dreamstime’s website also allows users to search its stock photographs by entering 
a search term.  Searching for the term “peppers” on Dreamstime’s site also returns 
images of jalapeno and bell peppers.  Almost every image on the first page of results 
are images of bell or jalapeno peppers (like the results from a Google Image search).  
Based on the images returned, it seems as if Dreamstime’s website and Google’s 
Case 5:18-cv-01910   Document 1   Filed 03/28/18   Page 51 of 84
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
  - 50 -  
COMPLAINT 
 
B
A
K
ER
 M
A
R
Q
U
A
R
T 
LL
P 
20
29
 C
EN
TU
R
Y
 P
A
R
K
 E
A
ST
, 1
6T
H
 F
LO
O
R
 
LO
S 
A
N
G
EL
ES
, C
A
 9
00
67
 
Te
l: 
(4
24
) 6
52
-7
80
0 
 ● 
 F
ax
: (
42
4)
 6
52
-7
85
0 
    
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
search algorithm both consider images of bell or jalapeno peppers highly relevant to 
a search for the term “peppers.”  Similarly, neither Google Images nor Dreamstime 
searches for “peppers” include images of peppercorns in the first page of image 
results on a search for “peppers.”  That is, Dreamstime’s search function returns 
stock photos of the very thing that Google’s own algorithm finds highly relevant to 
the search.  A consumer looking for stock photographs of bell or jalapeno peppers 
would find exactly what they were looking for on Dreamstime’s website – and this 
is precisely why Dreamstime used to enjoy a very high organic search ranking on 
Google prior to August 2015.  Below is a screen capture showing the first results 
returned when a user searches for the term “peppers” on Dreamstime’s website. 
 
  
Like Dreamstime, Shutterstock also allows users to search its stock photographs by 
keyword.  Searching for the term “peppers” on Shutterstock returns some pictures of 
bell and jalapeno peppers in the first page of stock photographs, but also returns 
some seemingly anomalous images including several photographs of peppercorns, 
Case 5:18-cv-01910   Document 1   Filed 03/28/18   Page 52 of 84
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
  - 51 -  
COMPLAINT 
 
B
A
K
ER
 M
A
R
Q
U
A
R
T 
LL
P 
20
29
 C
EN
TU
R
Y
 P
A
R
K
 E
A
ST
, 1
6T
H
 F
LO
O
R
 
LO
S 
A
N
G
EL
ES
, C
A
 9
00
67
 
Te
l: 
(4
24
) 6
52
-7
80
0 
 ● 
 F
ax
: (
42
4)
 6
52
-7
85
0 
    
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
what appears to be a white robot named “Pepper,” as well as many photographs of 
salt and pepper shakers.  Shutterstock’s image search algorithm returns less relevant 
results than either Google Images or Dreamstime on a search for the term “peppers.”  
Shutterstock’s results are less useful to a consumer interested in purchasing stock 
photos of bell or jalapeno peppers.   
 
 
 
85. Based on how Google Image’s algorithm processes a search for the 
term “peppers” and selects relevant images, one would expect that Dreamstime’s 
website would be more relevant than Shutterstock’s website when a user searched 
for stock photos of peppers.  This, however, is no longer the case.   When a user 
performs a (non-image) Google search for the terms “peppers stock photos,” among 
the first ten web pages returned from this search, positions two through five are for 
Shutterstock websites.  The second result returned is a link to 
www.shutterstock.com/search/pepper, the third result returned is 
www.shutterstock.com/search/serrano+peppers and the fourth result is 
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www.shuttterstock.com/search/bell-pepper.  Dreamstime’s website, however, is not 
listed in the first five pages of search results for this search (and on information and 
belief is not returned at all in Google’s search results pages for this search).  Again, 
many clearly less relevant websites are featured in the first five pages of results for 
this search, including a Google books result entitled “Trees in Paradise: a California 
History,” an article on the website Thrillist entitled “Bad Stock Photos – People 
Smoking Weed,” and an article entitled “Hilarious Twitter Thread Points Out 
Bizarre Cookbook Cover Trend” on the website www.scarymommy.com.  The harm 
to consumers is obvious.  A consumer seeking to purchase stock photographs of bell 
or jalapeno peppers and using a commonsense search like “peppers stock photos” 
would never find Dreamstime – a site highly relevant to this search.  That consumer 
would be not so subtly steered by Google to its partner Shutterstock’s page as 
Shutterstock occupied slots two through five in the top 10 – even though 
Shutterstock’s website is not as helpful to the consumer based on its ability to return 
relevant results. 
86. Dreamstime is not the only player Google has unfairly discriminated 
against in this fashion.  Others, such as 123RF, DepositPhotos, and CanStockPhoto, 
have similarly experienced significant drops in their organic search rankings.  
87. The graph below shows how the ranking for the websites Dreamstime, 
123rf.com, depositphotos.com and canstockphoto.com have changed over the time 
period September 2016 to February 2018.  The vertical axis plots the search ranking 
of each website when searching on Google for the term “stock photos.”  The graph 
clearly shows the drastic downward trend toward functional irrelevance for the most 
important Google search for the online stock photograph industry.  These smaller 
competitors in the online stock photography industry have seen their ranking in the 
“stock photos” search experience tremendous declines from September 2016 to 
February 2018. 
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The graph below shows the ranking for Dreamstime, Shutterstock, stock.adobe.com, 
and iStock (owned by Getty Images) over the same time.  This graph shows that, 
while Dreamstime was experiencing a precipitous decline in its ranking for the 
search “stock photos,” Shutterstock, Getty Images (through the website 
istockphotos.com) and Adobe enjoyed lasting stability near the top of the rankings 
(in a range that Dreamstime used to enjoy). 
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4. Google’s Discrimination Against Dreamstime Has Unfairly 
Helped Shutterstock Gain Market Share  
88. As described in detail above, Shutterstock is a significant player in the 
online stock photography industry and competes directly with Dreamstime.  It 
provides the same or similar services as Dreamstime – i.e., the licensing of online 
digital images.  Like Dreamstime, Shutterstock allows users to license an image for 
a period of time by paying a fee (instead of paying a royalty every time the customer 
used the image). 
89.   A company’s rank in organic search directly impacts its ability to 
attract customers and generate revenue.  Many empirical studies have tracked the 
behavior of search engine use and come to the same conclusion: users tend to focus 
on the top results for a given search and rarely investigate results beyond the first 
page of ranked results.  
90.  Shutterstock’s unfair advantage in organic search has increased its 
market share significantly. 
5. Google Has No Procompetitive Explanation for Its 
Exclusionary and Disparate Treatment of Dreamstime 
91. In response to these allegations, Google might attempt to point to some 
material change in Dreamstime’s metrics to justify its changed ranking in organic 
search (or, alternatively, may point to some metrics of Shutterstock, Getty Images 
and Adobe that justify their current organic search rankings), or claim that it fine-
tuned its search engine algorithm for some legitimate purpose in a way that 
impacted Dreamstime’s ranking.  This cannot be the explanation for what has 
happened to Dreamstime.  First, any such explanation would need to account for the 
fact that Shutterstock, Getty Images and Adobe have not suffered any similar 
downgrade in rankings.  Second, any potential explanation would need to account 
for why clearly irrelevant and poor-quality results such as the examples provided 
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above appear before Dreamstime in Google’s search ranking.  Dreamstime as a 
website is obviously more relevant to organic searches for terms related to stock 
photography – as evidenced by its long-time excellent performance in organic 
search prior to Google’s anticompetitive scheme.   Moreover, if some legitimate 
reason for Dreamstime’s dramatic plummet in Google’s organic search rankings 
existed (it does not), Google could have provided that explanation to Dreamstime 
during Dreamstime’s extensive efforts to meet with Google to address the issue.  As 
detailed above, that did not occur. 
6. Dreamstime and Other Online Stock Photography 
Competitors Have Suffered Antitrust Injury as Purchasers of 
Online Search Advertising 
92. Dreamstime and others – such as 123RF, DepositPhotos, and 
CanStockPhoto – have been denied a Google search ranking that truly reflects their 
relevance and credibility in the online stock photography industry.  This has resulted 
in a diminution of Dreamstime’s competitive position.  Dreamstime simply cannot 
compete with Shutterstock and Getty Images without being accurately and 
legitimately ranked by Google’s search engine.   
93. Google’s manipulation of Dreamstime’s organic search ranking has 
also negatively impacted Dreamstime’s ranking on other search engines.  
Dreamstime has recently started to experience a slow downward decline in its search 
ranking on other search engines such as Bing (albeit a small decline thus far).  This 
was an inevitable and foreseeable consequence of Dreamstime’s effective exclusion 
from Google’s search rankings: all search engines track consumer behavior and to 
the extent that Dreamstime’s traffic has diminished because of its fall in Google’s 
search ranking, its search ranking on other engines will naturally fall as well.  In 
addition, some changes that Dreamstime made to its website to reverse its decline in 
Google’s search rankings had consequences for its ranking on other search engines.  
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For example, when Dreamstime implemented the http/2 upgrade at Google’s 
suggestion, it was removed from Bing’s search listing for six months because Bing 
was not able to track the new technology.  Unlike Dreamstime’s experience with 
Google, however, Dreamstime was able to address its issue with Bing quickly and 
received input and advice that resolved that issue. 
94. Google’s unjustified and disparate treatment of Dreamstime has 
provided Shutterstock and Getty Images (and, in the short term, Adobe) with an 
unfair commercial advantage vis-á-vis Dreamstime.  Their placement near the top of 
the rankings for the most impactful online stock photography online searches 
provides Shutterstock and Getty Images with an unfair competitive advantage over 
Dreamstime and has by itself caused customers to license images from Shutterstock 
and Getty Images instead of Dreamstime. 
95. The result of Google’s abuse and exploitation of its online search 
advertising monopoly by means of anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct is 
that competition for online stock photography has been harmed.  Google’s acts have 
threatened to drive many competitors out of the business and created technological 
barriers to entry into the market which keep out potential new entrants.  Moreover, 
they have generated confusion in the marketplace and created an online stock 
photography industry with fewer choices for consumers, diminished pricing 
competition and reduced innovation.  All of these effects are a direct result of 
Google’s injury to competition. 
96. Competition in the online stock photography industry is reduced as 
Google effectively chooses market winners and puts those market winners in 
elevated and dominant positions.   In the online stock photography industry, 
Google’s discriminatory actions have enhanced power for favored competitors like 
Shutterstock and Getty Images while taking market share away from many other 
disfavored competitors.  In turn, they have allowed Google to gain more control 
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over a very significant set of websites that threaten Google’s online search 
advertising market, by ensuring that people still go to Google first when searching 
for images on the Internet.  Essentially, these discriminatory actions allow Google to 
eliminate some enemies to its online search monopoly, while keeping its remaining 
enemies closer.   
97. By exercising its entrenched online search advertising monopoly power 
to discriminate in favor of companies in which it has a direct financial and strategic 
interest, Google has unlawfully restricted competition and caused antitrust injury to 
online stock photography competitors and consumers. 
98. Google’s strategic manipulation of Dreamstime’s and others’ search 
rankings has caused a material reduction in Dreamstime’s web traffic and consumer 
purchases.  Because of the reduction in traffic and customers, Dreamstime has been 
damaged and will, unless the acts complained of here are remedied, continue to be 
damaged because its prospective revenues are closely tied to its web traffic from 
Google searches. 
99. Google’s conduct is intended to, and does, unlawfully protect the 
financial and strategic benefits it enjoys by virtue of its partnerships and 
arrangements with Shutterstock and Getty images, Dreamstime’s chief rivals.   
100. Google’s conduct deprives smaller rivals in the online stock 
photography industry of a distribution channel sufficient to achieve efficient scale, 
thereby raising costs of doing business and slowing or preventing effective market 
entry and/or expansion. 
101. Most importantly, Google’s conduct reinforces its monopoly in online 
search advertising by diminishing an important “vertical search” threat to Google’s 
search dominance. 
102. Google’s conduct restricts competition and harms consumer welfare 
because it: (a) increases the incentive for Google itself, as a monopolist, to continue 
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to foreclose competitors such as Dreamstime from competition on the merits; (b) 
effectively deprives competitors, on a discriminatory basis, of access to Google’s 
search engine ranking which is a necessary selling/marketing facility or resource; 
and (c) has aided Shutterstock and Getty Images in enjoying unfair competitive 
advantages as online stock photography players, which in turn has left that industry 
with fewer choices, reduced or stifled innovation and technological advances and 
diminished pricing competition (in addition to generating consumer confusion). 
103.   Prior to Google’s discrimination against Dreamstime and other 
competitors, consumers had more choice.  That is, when Dreamstime was ranked in 
the top three of search results for online stock photography, users searching for 
online stock photography had easy, direct access to the 72 million stock photographs 
on Dreamstime’s website.  Due to Google’s anticompetitive scheme, a former 
competitor previously ranked in the top three for online stock photography searches 
that received a substantial portion of the views from such searches is now gone from 
Google’s search result – along with its 72 million digital images that consumers 
could choose from.  Consumers searching for online stock photography now have 
access to only Shutterstock’s, Getty Images’ and Adobe’s digital catalogs, along 
with various public domain image websites and Junk Websites completely unhelpful 
for consumers interested in purchasing licensed stock photography. 
C. Google Also Breaches Its AdWords Agreement with Dreamstime 
and Unfairly Manipulates Its Advertising Service to Enhance Its 
Monopoly Power in Online Search Advertising  
1. Dreamstime Has Entered into a Contract with Google as a 
Purchaser of Google’s AdWords Service 
104. Google generates a significant amount of its revenue from AdWords, 
its advertising service through which companies pay Google to have advertisements 
for their websites prominently displayed in Google’s search results. 
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105. To use AdWords, advertisers must agree to the Google LLC 
Advertising Program Terms along with several related terms and conditions (the 
“AdWords Agreement”).  See Exhibit “F.”  The AdWords Agreement provides that 
in consideration for an advertiser’s payment, Google will display its advertisements, 
subject to certain limitations.  In part, the AdWords Agreement states that use is 
subject to applicable Google advertising polices.  
106. Google drafted both the AdWords Agreement and advertising polices.  
The agreements are adhesion contracts, as Google offers its services on a “take it or 
leave it” basis without giving consumers opportunities to negotiate terms to benefit 
their needs or interests. 
107. One recent update to the AdWords Agreement in late 2017 included an 
arbitration clause with an option to opt out, and Dreamstime elected to opt out of 
this clause. 
108. In return for the obligations and other consideration to which 
purchasers agreed in the AdWords Agreement, Google agreed to provide the 
AdWords program to each and every purchaser executing the standard AdWords 
Agreement.  This program was and is described in various answers to Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQs) in Google’s AdWords support pages, which were 
incorporated by reference into the AdWords Agreement.  Attached as Exhibit “G” is 
the AdWords agreement in effect around the time Dreamstime became an AdWords 
purchaser that specifically referenced and incorporated the FAQs.  The AdWords 
program uses an auction system to determine which advertisements are shown and 
how much an advertisement costs.  Advertisers bid for relevant search term 
keywords such as "stock photo" or "digital image."  AdWords then assigns each 
advertisement a "quality score" based on multiple factors including click-through 
rate ("CTR") (the percentage of users who view the ad that actually click it), 
relevance to the keywords, and the quality of the advertiser's website.  Each time a 
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Google user enters search terms that include relevant keywords, AdWords 
determines which of the competing advertisements are displayed by factoring both 
an advertiser's bid amount and quality score.  Thus, the lower the advertisement’s 
quality score, the higher the bid must be for the ad to compete.  
109. Advertisers place bids on the “cost per click” of each advertisement.  
Advertisers can choose to either manually bid or pay an extra fee to select from 
automatic bidding options that use algorithms to adjust and optimize bid amounts 
based on specific advertising goals.  Automatic bidding options are referred to by 
Google as “marketing campaigns.”  Common marketing campaigns include 
targeting spending on advertisements with the lowest cost per acquisition or on 
advertisements that maximize the number of clicks generated.  For a specific 
advertiser, acquisitions might include customer visits resulting in sales, signups, or 
mobile app downloads. 
110. When using marketing campaigns, advertisers specify the amount, on 
average, they would like to spend each day on a particular campaign.  Google then 
aims to show advertisements as much as possible until the daily budget is met.  
Google explains that “in a given billing period, you’re never charged more than the 
average number of days in a month (roughly 30.4) times your daily budget.”  
111. In or around 2005, Dreamstime entered the AdWords Agreement with 
Google when it began paying Google to display its advertisements on Google’s 
search results.  Implicit in this Agreement was Google’s duty to provide its 
advertising services to Dreamstime in good faith and not take actions that unfairly 
favored Dreamtime’s competitors.  Dreamstime’s decision to enter into the 
AdWords Agreement and its good faith understanding of the terms of Google’s 
AdWords Agreement and advertising policies were always based on the text of 
those agreements, Google’s stated policies and Google’s treatment of competing 
online stock photography sites.  
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112. Dreamstime has engaged in several different marketing campaigns with 
the goal of promoting its advertisements with the lowest cost per acquisition.  That 
is, to promote its advertisements with the best combination of quality score, bid 
amount, and resulting customer acquisitions.  In doing so, Dreamstime as a 
customer pays Google daily to determine which of its advertisements are the most 
effective and to increase their circulation accordingly.    
113. Despite Google’s agreement to provide Dreamstime with effective 
marketing campaigns pursuant to policies that were uniformly agreed to and 
intended to apply uniformly to all purchasers who executed the standard AdWords 
Agreement, several of Dreamstime’s campaigns have suddenly stopped acquiring 
customers for no apparent reason.  In other words, Dreamstime was seeing a 
steady, predictable number of acquisitions from these campaigns each week, and 
then suddenly these acquisitions dropped to zero and remained at zero without any 
decline in the number of viewer impressions.  Dreamstime has been unable to get 
any support from Google on this issue, despite multiple requests for an explanation.  
Google’s only response has been that the campaigns are working as they should.  As 
noted below, Google has not uniformly applied its own policies to all of its 
customers who have executed the standard AdWords Agreement and who are 
competitors in online stock photography.  Instead, it has disparately applied its 
policies to Dreamstime as compared to other of Dreamstime’s competitors.  In 
addition, Google has cancelled certain Dreamstime ad campaigns on the basis that 
they violated stated policies that the ad campaigns did not violate. 
2. Google Has Engaged in Bad Faith Through Improper 
Disapproval and Removal of Dreamstime Advertisements 
from Its Online Network 
114. Google’s advertising policies understandably prohibit the use of 
misleading content in advertisements, and the standard AdWords Agreement is 
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intended to ensure that these policies apply equally to all purchasers of AdWords.  
The policies specifically provide the following examples of misleading 
advertisements that would be subject to rejection or removal: “making false 
statements about your identity or qualifications; using false claims or claims that 
entice the user with an improbable result; falsely implying affiliation with, or 
endorsement by, an individual, organization, product, or service; ads that mislead or 
trick the user into interacting with them (‘trick to click’); or providing a business 
name that is anything other than the domain.” 
115. Google has consistently removed Dreamstime’s lowest cost per 
acquisition advertisements as being “trick to click” despite Dreamstime’s 
competitors running the exact same type of advertisements, without any apparent 
issue or objection from Google.26  Google’s purported complaint with these ads 
concerned the “search box” that invited users to search Dreamstime’s website.  
When a user clicked on this search box, the user was taken to Dreamstime’s website 
(as opposed to search results appearing in the actual box).  Ironically, Google later 
encouraged Dreamstime to submit HTML5 banners with a non-functional search 
box that transferred the user to Dreamstime’s website.  Google accepted and ran 
these HTML5 banner ads on Dreamstime’s behalf.  Google’s technical staff has also 
given inconsistent or puzzling explanations to Dreamstime about why certain ads 
were “trick to click.”  In a Google hangouts conversation, a Google staff member 
told Dreamstime that Dreamstime’s swirl logo with a white background was “trick 
to click.”  Dreamstime’s AdWords contact at Google apologized when passing 
along this statement to Dreamstime. 
                                                 
26 See Exhibit “H” attached hereto, which provides a snapshot of advertisements 
currently running on Google’s DisplayAds platform for one of Dreamstime’s 
competitors that have the same purported “trick to click” characteristics that Google 
rejected in Dreamstime’s ads, i.e. “fake” search boxes. 
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116. Even more telling is the fact that Google continued to remove 
Dreamstime’s low cost per acquisition advertisements as “trick to click” while 
allowing Dreamstime’s high costs per acquisition display advertisements of the 
same type to remain active.   
117. Each time an advertisement’s cost per acquisition began to drop, it was 
removed as being allegedly “trick to click” despite the fact that other Dreamstime 
advertisements having the exact same format, but having higher cost per acquisition, 
were left running. 
118. Dreamstime engaged in extensive efforts to resolve these issues with 
Google and spent countless hours emailing and calling Google to find out: why its 
low cost per acquisition advertisements were being removed, how it could modify 
them so that they would follow Google’s advertising polices, and why competitor 
sites could display advertisements with the same format but without repercussion.  
Dreamstime also asked Google to reconsider its decision to remove its 
advertisements.  
119. At Google’s suggestion, Dreamstime implemented HTML5 versions of 
its search bar ads, which added an actual dynamic search input field to the 
advertisement and thereby removed any likelihood that the consumer might be 
“tricked” into clicking a search field that was not active.  This dynamic search box 
could be used by users as if they were searching directly on Dreamstime’s website. 
For example, typing “trees” in the field and pressing the banner’s Search button 
would open a page of “trees” search results on Dreamstime’s website.  For several 
months, Google allowed these ads to run even though the search function was not 
working properly because of a technical problem with Google’s system.  Google 
then began removing the ads again in the same fashion as the non-dynamic versions.  
Later, Google updated its ad validation tool to disallow ads with dynamic search 
boxes from being accepted into Google’s ad system.  Thereafter, Dreamstime was 
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only allowed to upload ad banners without a dynamic search box feature.  Per 
Google’s new specifications, Dreamstime resubmitted the banners with a search box 
that did not work.  As of March 2018, Dreamstime’s banners include a search box 
that does not work, which behave exactly as the non-dynamic banners initially 
removed, despite Google’s initial assurance that Dreamstime’s HTML5 efforts 
would result in workable, dynamic search ads.  
120. Similarly, Google removed Dreamstime’s mobile application (“app”) 
because it featured lingerie photographs while Shutterstock’s remained active 
despite featuring explicit nude photographs.  While the images from Shutterstock’s 
app are particularly “not safe for work” and therefore not attached as exhibits, 
Dreamstime can provide at the appropriate time a comparison of the images Google 
found objectionable on Dreamstime’s app and images from Shutterstock’s app that 
demonstrate Google’s double standard.  When Dreamstime inquired about this 
discrepancy in treatment, Google stated that its review was limited to Dreamstime’s 
mobile app and that if Dreamstime wanted to address the issue, it should lodge a 
formal complaint concerning Shutterstock’s app.  Following Google’s instruction, 
Dreamstime lodged a complaint only to have it summarily ignored.  
121. Google wields its immense power in the online search engine 
advertising market discriminatorily by allowing only some customers in 
downstream businesses to use effective, low cost advertisements.  Google uses 
selective enforcement of its removal policies as one of its bases for discriminating 
and to attempt to conceal its competitively unfair behavior.  By doing so, Google 
ensures that disfavored downstream competitors like Dreamstime pay more to 
Google for displaying less effective advertisements.  This provides a huge windfall 
for Google all at Dreamstime’s expense, while simultaneously benefitting Google 
and its partners such as Shutterstock and Getty Images. 
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122. In addition to being a breach of contract, Google’s unfair enforcement 
of its advertising polices has resulted in diminution of Dreamstime’s competitive 
position among online stock photography repositories.   Dreamstime cannot 
compete at the level that rival sites compete while Google continues to unfairly 
discriminate against its low cost per acquisition advertisements.  
123. Google’s unjustified and disparate treatment of Dreamstime has 
provided it and its partners with an unfair commercial advantage vis-à-vis 
Dreamstime.  The ability to display cost effective advertisements on Google’s 
search results provides Google’s favored partners with an unfair competitive 
advantage that has caused customers to purchase digital images from them instead 
of Dreamstime.  
3. Google has Caused Significant Contractual Damages and 
Anticompetitive Injury to Dreamstime Though Its Coordinated 
Manipulation of Online Search and AdWords Campaigns 
124. Since its inception, Dreamstime has spent approximately $50 million 
on its AdWords campaigns, and spends hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
AdWords per month.  When Dreamstime began to experience a drop in its organic 
search traffic caused by Google’s manipulation of its search ranking, it increased its 
monthly AdWords budget by approximately 50% in an attempt to mitigate the 
damage caused by the changes to Google’s algorithm.  Despite the increase in its 
advertising budget, as a direct result of Google’s manipulation of Dreamstime’s 
search ranking and its unfair enforcement of its AdWords policies, Dreamstime has 
lost millions of dollars, its cost of acquiring new customers has doubled, and its 
growth has slowed by approximately 50%.    
125. Google’s evisceration of Dreamstime’s organic search ranking and 
Google’s unfair and uneven enforcement of its AdWords policies worked both 
independently and in concert to harm Dreamstime and benefit Google.  Of course, 
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even if Google had not unfairly enforced its AdWords’ policies, it would have been 
basically impossible for Dreamstime to increase its monthly advertising spend 
enough to “undo” the damage wrought by Google’s changes to its search algorithm.  
This is because Dreamstime’s prior, pre-2015 organic search ranking drove five or 
six times more traffic to its website than its AdWords campaigns.  Importantly, 
Dreamstime’s pre-2015 search ranking was “free” in the sense that it was a natural 
result of Dreamstime maintaining a quality stock image website highly relevant to 
stock photography searches and did not require Dreamstime to pay Google anything.  
Despite Dreamstime’s efforts to compensate for the loss in traffic from organic 
search by spending more on AdWords (a reaction Google no doubt expected and 
intended when it began to manipulate Dreamstime’s search ranking), Dreamstime 
was unable to sustain the increased AdWords spending on a long-term basis due to 
the losses in organic search and Google’s unfair enforcement of its AdWords 
policies.  As a result of Google’s tinkering with its algorithm to eliminate 
Dreamstime from organic stock photography searches, Google also experienced an 
uptick in AdWords revenue as Dreamstime struggled to reach customers it 
previously reached through organic search.  This, in turn, works to eliminate an 
important “vertical search” threat to Google’s online search advertising monopoly. 
V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION  
(Monopoly Maintenance and Abuse in Violation of  
Section Two of the Sherman Act) 
126. Dreamstime realleges the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if 
fully set forth herein. 
127. The actions complained of herein will continue to restrain trade, allow 
Google to maintain, exploit, and abuse its online search advertising monopoly 
power, and adversely affect interstate commerce in that Google provides and sells 
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its services across State lines and on the Internet.  The defendant and plaintiff also 
each purchase goods and supplies in interstate commerce that are used in the 
services and offerings that comprise their businesses. 
128. The antitrust laws are concerned with protecting the economic freedom 
of participants and consumers in the relevant market.  The aims and objectives of 
the antitrust laws are directed at encouraging innovation, industry, and competition.  
The central purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve competition and it is that 
interaction of competitive forces that benefits consumers.  The antitrust laws protect 
customers from harm directly related to the unlawful removal of a competitive 
service or product from the marketplace.  
129. Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) prohibits, inter alia, 
monopolization of any part of the trade or commerce among the States. 
130. Because of the discriminatory practices and conduct, contracts and 
agreements with Dreamstime’s rivals, and the other exclusionary and 
anticompetitive actions carried out by the monopolist in the online search 
advertising market, plaintiff Dreamstime has lost actual and prospective business 
and Internet traffic – all necessary and essential components to survive and prosper 
as an online stock photography competitor. 
131. Relevant Product/Service Markets.  The relevant product or service 
market for antitrust purposes in which to assess Google’s power and conduct is 
defined as the online search advertising market.  There are no reasonable substitutes 
for online search services and there are no other means by which consumers and 
Internet users can reasonably and efficiently perform automated searches for online 
data and websites.  Likewise, there are no reasonable substitutes for the provision of 
online search advertising, a marketplace in which Dreamstime is a purchaser.  The 
cross-elasticity of demand between online search advertising services and other 
forms of finding such information is extremely low.  The DOJ and FTC have both 
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recognized a relevant market defined as online search advertising on multiple 
occasions, specifically as it relates to Google.  Dreamstime is dependent upon and a 
consumer/purchaser of various Google online services.  Dreamstime is a distributor 
and seller of online stock photography.  Dreamstime and competition for online 
stock photography has been excluded, destroyed, and or restrained because of 
Google’s maintenance, exploitation, and abuse of its monopoly power in the 
relevant market for online search advertising. 
132. Relevant market definition is a fact-intensive determination. 
133. Relevant Geographic Market.  The relevant geographic market for 
antitrust purposes in this case is the United States.  The relevant geographic market 
is the area of effective competition in which the parties operate and to which 
customers can practicably turn for the desired services.  The online services 
provided by Google in the United States differ from those it offers or provides in 
foreign countries and different rules and regulations often apply.  Further, the 
federal antitrust laws only reach conduct within the United States that affects 
domestic consumers. 
134. Monopoly Power.  Throughout the relevant period, Google has been 
the dominant and entrenched player in the domestic online search market and online 
search advertising market (to the extent those markets are considered distinct), 
possessing a market share of at least 70%.  Generally, a market share of 65% or 
more is a prima facie showing of monopoly power.  Accordingly, Google is a 
monopolist in this market(s).  Google has the power to control prices, exclude 
competition, reduce output and selection, and/or stifle technology and innovation in 
the relevant market(s). 
135. Market or monopoly power determination is a fact-intensive issue 
reserved for the fact-finder. 
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136. Google has maintained, exploited, and abused its monopoly power in 
the online search advertising market in violation of the monopolization proscription 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Plaintiff Dreamstime and other of its rivals in the 
online stock photography industry are customers of various of Google’s online 
advertising services and have suffered antitrust injury and damages as a direct 
consequence of Google’s monopoly exploitation and abuses. 
137. Significant Barriers to Market Entry and Expansion.  Significant 
and high barriers to market entry and expansion exist that preclude or discourage 
new firms from entering the domestic online search advertising market and 
challenging the behemoth Google’s entrenched monopoly position.  Significant 
barriers to expansion also exist, which is evidenced by the fact that only a small 
number of competitors have managed to marginally penetrate this market dominated 
and controlled by Google.  Indeed, many potential big players have exited the online 
search advertising market, and none have been able to capture any significant 
market shares.  Some of these significant barriers to entry and expansion include: (a) 
requirement of intellectual property and licenses; (b) regulatory controls and 
restrictions; (c) high capital costs; (d) economies of scale; (e) control and 
maintenance of technological resources; (f) brand loyalty; (g) entrenched user 
preferences; and (h) all-important network effects. 
138. General Intent to Monopolize.  Google has undertaken its clearly 
anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct with the purpose of maintaining and 
abusing its monopoly in the online search advertising market in the United States 
and to vanquish and injure Dreamstime and other smaller rivals in the online stock 
photography industry.  Google has acted to eliminate, destroy, or foreclose 
meaningful competition in the relevant market through the discriminatory tactics 
described above.  Google’s conduct discourages, prevents, and/or precludes 
consumers from finding, accessing and/or buying services from Dreamstime and 
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other stock photo repositories directly, which in the long run would erode Google’s 
standing as the first place to go to search for stock photos on the Internet.  During 
the relevant period, Google has provided services to Dreamstime, is keenly aware of 
its capabilities and has deemed Dreamstime to be a target to be minimized or 
eliminated. 
139. Antitrust Standing.  Plaintiff Dreamstime has the requisite standing to 
assert and maintain antitrust claims against Google because it has suffered antitrust 
injury because of Google’s maintenance, exploitation, and abuse of its monopoly 
power through its discriminatory and exclusionary conduct.  Dreamstime is a 
purchaser/consumer of Google’s AdWords services, consumers use Google’s online 
search services to locate, access, and buy online stock photography products from 
Dreamstime and other market participants, and Google has licensing and other 
written agreements with various online stock photography competitors such as 
Shutterstock and Getty Images that are designed to exclude competition.  Indeed, 
online stock photography providers are critically dependent upon Google’s services 
for website traffic and customers.  Consequently, in addition to injury Dreamstime 
as a consumer of Internet search advertising, Google’s services and monopoly 
conduct are inextricably intertwined with and materially affect competition in the 
online stock photography line of commerce.  In addition, by reason of Dreamstime’s 
business relationship and service contracts with Google it is a participant and 
consumer in the online search advertising market.  Finally, as a “vertical search” 
website that consumers may access directly to search for something many people 
commonly google – high-quality images for purchase – Dreamstime poses a direct 
threat to Google’s online search advertising monopoly, and its elimination enhances 
Google’s monopoly in the relevant market. 
140. Google’s Predatory and Exclusionary Conduct.  Google has 
willfully acquired and/or maintained its monopoly power in the online search 
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market (and/or online search advertising market) and has abused that power using 
anticompetitive and exclusionary means, including by excluding and distorting 
competition in online stock photography.  Google’s overall monopolistic and 
discriminatory scheme is described specifically in Paragraphs 1–13 and 46–125 
above.  Such unlawful conduct undertaken by the monopolist, Google, includes: (a) 
downgrading Dreamstime’s online search ranking (making it essentially invisible in 
Google’s search results), without justification, forcing Dreamstime to spend 
additional funds on Google’s AdWords program, thereby raising Dreamstime’s 
costs of competing and threatening to drive it out of business; (b) contracting with 
Shutterstock to give it a favored status that has not been available to Dreamstime 
and other rivals; (c) contracting with Getty Images to give it favored status that has 
not been available to Dreamstime and other rivals; (d) providing favored treatment 
to Shutterstock and other competitors in online search results or other online search 
displays, unfairly allowing these favored rivals to poach longstanding customers 
from Dreamstime, or thwarting efforts of Dreamstime to attract and obtain new 
customers; (e) selectively enforcing its rules governing its online AdWords 
program, thereby further undermining Dreamstime’s ability to compete; (f) moving, 
in the online search rankings, inconsequential or underperforming (junk) rivals 
ahead of Dreamstime and other established, high quality or low-priced online stock 
photography repositories; and (g) engaging in unlawful activity to capture privacy 
protected data of consumers, thereby maintaining and enhancing Google’s 
monopoly power.  The purpose of Google’s predatory and discriminatory scheme is 
to limit or foreclose competition for online stock photography and maintain its 
monopoly in online search advertising.   
141. Google has acted to maintain its monopoly power, and its existing 
enormous power and anticompetitive conduct has enabled it to do so, in flagrant 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
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142. The “conduct” element of this offense is the use of monopoly power to 
foreclose competition or to destroy a competitor.  Conduct is anticompetitive when 
it unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors to gain or maintain a monopoly.  
Anticompetitive or exclusionary practices are acts designed to deter potential rivals 
from entering the market, intervening or preventing access to customers, or 
preventing existing rivals in the market from increasing their output.  
Anticompetitive acts are not fair competition on the merits of price, selection, 
quality or other factors, but instead acts that have the deleterious effect of preventing 
or excluding competition or frustrating the efforts of other firms to compete for 
customers within the relevant market.  Conduct by a monopolist that constitutes a 
deliberate effort to discourage or thwart customers from doing business with its 
rivals is anticompetitive. 
143. Conduct or practices that otherwise might comply with antitrust law 
may be impermissibly exclusionary and unlawful when engaged in by a monopolist.  
Indeed, a monopolist is not free to take certain actions that a firm in a competitive 
(or even oligopolistic) market may take, because there is not a market constraint on 
a monopolist’s behavior.  Consequently, a monopolist is precluded from employing 
otherwise lawful practices that unnecessarily diminish or exclude competition. 
144. Google’s anticompetitive acts affect a substantial amount of interstate 
commerce in the relevant market and constitute unlawful monopolization.  Google’s 
conduct is not motivated by technological or efficiency concerns and has no valid or 
legitimate business justifications.  Any purported business justifications that may be 
proffered by Google are merely pretextual.  In sum, the purpose and effect of 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct is to preserve, exploit, and promote its monopoly 
stranglehold position in the online search advertising marketplace and to misuse that 
mighty power to exclude, control, and restrict competition for online stock 
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photography to the detriment of consumer welfare, competition, innovation, and 
plaintiff Dreamstime. 
145. Antitrust Injury to Plaintiff, Competition, and Consumers.  
Google’s monopolistic conduct has caused antitrust injury to plaintiff Dreamstime, 
competition, and consumers. 
146. As a direct result of Google’s abuse of its online search advertising 
monopoly through anticompetitive conduct and restrictions on competition, 
Dreamstime and other smaller online stock photography competitors have been 
restricted from functioning in a competitive open market, output has been reduced 
or limited, and the quality and freedom of choice of online stock photographs and 
providers has been reduced and diminished in this concentrated industry.  Google’s 
monopolistic and discriminatory conduct has severely hindered plaintiff’s ability to 
attract new customers and traffic to its website, and the number of photographs it 
may license/sell has diminished significantly. 
147. Google’s monopolistic and discriminatory conduct has erected a barrier 
that precludes effective entry by other would-be competitors into the industry and 
the quality and variety of online stock photography offerings in that industry have 
been reduced and constrained to the detriment of consumers. 
148. Google’s maintenance and exploitation of its online search advertising 
monopoly and exercise of predatory and anticompetitive conduct has caused 
antitrust injury, and unless enjoined by this Court, will continue to produce at least 
the following actual and demonstrative anticompetitive, exclusionary, and injurious 
effects upon competition, consumers, and interstate commerce: (a) AdWords spends 
for lower cost stock repositories like Dreamstime will continue to increase, thereby 
increasing costs to consumer or eliminating consumer choices; (b) competition in 
the online distribution and sale of stock photographs has been substantially and 
unreasonably restricted, lessened, foreclosed, and eliminated; (c) barriers to entry 
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into this highly concentrated industry have been raised which has prevented or 
delayed entry of new online stock photography competitors; (d) consumer choice 
has been, and will continue to be, significantly reduced, limited, and constrained as 
to selection price, and quality of online stock photographs; (e) access to 
Dreamstime’s competitive services has been artificially restricted and reduced, and 
its service offerings will continue to be excluded; and (f) Google has maintained its 
entrenched monopoly position in the online search advertising market. 
149. Antitrust injury is a fact question for the jury.  
150. Damage to Plaintiff Dreamstime.  Because of, and as a direct and 
proximate result of Google’s past and continuing anticompetitive practices and 
conduct, plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, substantial financial 
injury to its business and property.  Defendant’s coordinated and focused 
anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct has cumulatively, incrementally, and 
unreasonably restricted competition and devastated Dreamstime’s once thriving and 
growing business.  As a result, plaintiff has been deprived of revenues and profits it 
would have otherwise made, incurred higher advertising costs, suffered diminished 
market growth, and sustained a loss of goodwill and going concern value.  Plaintiff 
has not yet calculated the precise extent of its past damages and cannot now estimate 
with precision the future damages that continue to accrue, but when it does so, it 
will seek leave of the Court to insert the amount of the damages sustained herein. 
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief to prevent further irreparable and continuing 
injury to its business and property caused by Google’s unlawful conduct. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
151. Dreamstime realleges the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if 
fully set forth herein.  
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152. This Court has jurisdiction over this Second Cause of Action based on 
diversity jurisdiction. 
153. Dreamstime entered into enforceable contracts with Google whereby 
Google agreed to provide advertising services for Dreamstime’s website in 
exchange for various fees.  In particular, the AdWords Agreement was an adhesion 
contract intended to be executed by every single purchaser of AdWords.  It 
incorporated by reference the AdWords program polices and various FAQ answers 
and support pages describing Google’s policies.  The nature of this standard 
agreement was that it was intended to be signed in the same form by all purchasers 
of AdWords, and the policies and descriptions of the services Google was to provide 
were intended to apply equally to all who executed it.  
154. Despite the AdWords Agreement, Google provided Dreamstime 
advertising marketing campaigns that did not work and did not meet Dreamstime’s 
expectations, applied its policies and procedures unevenly toward Dreamstime, 
cancelled some of Dreamstime’s ad campaigns for violating stated polices that the 
ad campaigns did not violate and overcharged and overdelivered AdWords to 
Dreamstime, all in breach of the AdWords Agreement.  No reasonable explanation 
for these failures was provided by Google.  Google failed to provide the services, 
apply the standard policies and perform the obligations that the AdWords 
Agreement required it to do. 
155. Among other things, Google breached its contract with Dreamstime 
when it: 
• manipulated Dreamstime’s organic search ranking unfairly and illegally to 
force Dreamstime to spend an unreasonable amount of money on 
additional AdWords campaigns that would not otherwise have been 
necessary; 
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• cancelled Dreamstime’s most successful ad campaigns without adequate 
notice or explanation; 
• improperly suspended Dreamstime’s account based on unfounded 
accusations of “policy violations;” 
• prevented Dreamstime from running successful DisplayAds campaigns 
while allowing the exact same advertisements to be placed by other 
competitors and other parties to the same standard contracts; 
• placed Dreamstime’s advertisements on irrelevant websites and error 
pages in direct violation of the AdWords contract; and 
• overdelivered AdWords campaigns, causing daily spending limits for 
certain campaigns to be exceeded on a regular and systematic basis. 
156. Dreamstime has at all times performed all its significant duties and 
obligations under the AdWords Agreement except to the extent that Dreamstime 
was excused or prevented from doing so by the acts and omissions of Google.  
157. Google’s breaching conduct was the result of fraud or willful injury to 
Dreamstime, was in violation of law, and/or was at least negligent, such that any 
limitation of liability clause in the AdWords Agreement is void pursuant to 
California Civil Code § 1668.  At most, it has acted intentionally and with reckless 
disregard for Dreamstime’s rights. 
158. As a direct and proximate result of Google’s breach of the written 
contracts, Dreamstime has suffered actual, compensatory, and consequential 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus prejudgment interest at the 
maximum legal rate. These damages include but are not limited to lost profits and 
other consequential damages that are not waivable by contract as a matter of law due 
to Google’s heightened culpability. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION  
(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
159. Dreamstime realleges the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if 
fully set forth herein.  
160. This Court has jurisdiction over this Third Cause of Action based on 
diversity jurisdiction. 
161. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract, 
including the AdWords Agreement, and is intended to prevent one party from 
unfairly frustrating the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the contract.  The 
covenant of good faith finds particular application, whereas here, Google is invested 
with discretionary power to affect the rights of Dreamstime.  Google was charged 
with the duty to exercise that discretion in good faith and in accordance with fair 
dealing.  Google failed to do either.  Google’s unjustified breach deprived 
Dreamstime of its legitimate expectations under the AdWords Agreement.   
162. Google breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
improperly disapproving and removing Dreamstime’s low cost per acquisition 
advertisements despite them not being in violation of Google’s advertising policies.    
163. Google also breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
by improperly disapproving and removing Dreamstime’s low cost per acquisition 
advertisements as being “trick to click” or for other unreasonable reasons to provide 
an economic advantage to Dreamstime’s competitors and to overcharge Dreamstime 
for AdWords services. 
164. Google’s breaching conduct was the result of fraud or willful injury to 
Dreamstime, was in violation of law, and/or was at least negligent, such that any 
limitation of liability clause in the AdWords Agreement is void pursuant to 
California Civil Code § 1668.  At most, it has acted intentionally and with reckless 
disregard for Dreamstime’s rights. 
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165. As a direct and proximate result of Google’s breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, Dreamstime has suffered actual, compensatory, and 
consequential damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus prejudgment 
interest at the maximum legal rate.  These damages include but are not limited to 
lost profits and other consequential damages that are not waivable by contract as a 
matter of law due to Google’s heightened culpability. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION  
(Unfair Competition in Violation of California Business  
and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.) 
166. Dreamstime realleges the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if 
fully set forth herein.  
167. This Court has jurisdiction over this Fourth Cause of Action based on 
diversity jurisdiction.  
168. Section 17200 et seq. of the California Business & Professions Code 
(“UCL”) is written in the disjunctive and broadly covers three varieties of unfair 
competition – acts that are unlawful or unfair or fraudulent.  The UCL statute’s 
intent and purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair 
competition in commercial markets for goods and services.  The coverage of section 
17200 et seq. is broad and intended to enjoin on-going wrongful business conduct in 
whatever context such activity might occur. 
169. Plaintiff Dreamstime is a “person” within the meaning of California 
Business & Professions Code § 17201.  Google’s principal place of business is 
located within California. 
170. As alleged herein, defendant’s predatory, discriminatory, deceptive, 
monopolistic and/or concerted wrongful conduct constitutes “unfair” business 
practices.  A practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by 
some other law.  Conduct that significantly threatens or harms competition, violates 
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the policy or spirit of an antitrust law, or threatens an incipient violation of an 
antitrust law, may be deemed “unfair” under the UCL. 
171. As alleged herein, defendant’s anticompetitive conduct is also 
“unlawful” under the UCL.  Within the meaning of section 17200, virtually any 
violation of any civil or criminal federal, state or municipal, statutory, regulatory, 
court-made or local law can serve as a predicate offense for an “unlawful” claim.  
The violations of the federal antitrust laws and other concerted and deceptive 
conduct as alleged herein, satisfies the “unlawful” prong of section 17200. 
172. Dreamstime has standing to pursue this claim as Dreamstime has 
suffered an injury in fact and has lost money or property resulting from Google’s 
unfair and/or unlawful actions.  Dreamstime has paid tens of millions of dollars for 
Google’s advertising and other services.  Google only provided its services 
selectively to benefit itself at Dreamstime’s expense.  Google also selectively 
applied its disapproval and removal policies to injure Dreamstime and benefit others 
such as Shutterstock and Getty Images, Google’s partners. Google’s anticompetitive 
and discriminatory actions constitute unfair and/or unlawful business practices and a 
scheme of unfair competition with respect to Google’s advertising services and 
contracts.  Google has engaged, and continues to engage, in business acts that are 
unfair, unlawful, discriminatory, deceptive, untrue or misleading with respect to the 
advertising services it provided to Dreamstime. The harm to consumers and 
competition caused by Google’s conduct is substantial.  There is no legitimate or 
procompetitive justification for defendant’s anticompetitive and discriminatory 
conduct. 
173. Because of, and as a direct and proximate result of, defendant’s unfair 
and/or unlawful business practices and conduct, Dreamstime has suffered, and will 
continue to suffer, financial injury to its business and property.  Pursuant to the 
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provisions of the UCL (sections 17203 and 17535), Dreamstime is entitled to 
restitution from Google for its injury. 
174. Defendant’s unfair and/or unlawful conduct has caused economic harm 
to plaintiff, competition and consumers.  Nonetheless, the UCL is a strict liability 
statute and it is not necessary to show that defendants intended to injure or harm 
Dreamstime. 
175. Whether a business practice is unfair or unlawful is a question of fact 
for the fact-finder to determine. 
176. An act may violate the UCL even if the unfair or unlawful practice 
affects only one victim. 
177. Pursuant to Business & Professions Code section 17203, the entry of 
permanent and mandatory injunctive relief against Google is necessary to enjoin its 
on-going unfair and/or unlawful business conduct.  An injunction is needed to 
enable and restore competition in the market. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
  WHEREFORE, Dreamstime respectfully requests that this Court adjudge and 
decree and enter judgment in its favor and against Google, as follows:  
1. The conduct alleged in the First Cause of Action herein be adjudged to 
constitute unlawful monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 
U.S.C. § 2);  
2. The conduct alleged in the Second Cause of Action be adjudged to 
constitute an unjustified breach of contract;  
3. The conduct alleged in the Third Cause of Action be adjudged to 
constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;  
4. The conduct alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action herein be adjudged 
to constitute a violation of section 17200 et seq. of the California Business & 
Professions Code as an unfair and/or unlawful business practice;  
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5. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §15), plaintiff 
recover treble the actual amount of its damages sustained by reason of defendant’s 
antitrust violations;  
6.         Pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §15), plaintiff be 
awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation; 
7.         Pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §26), the 
anticompetitive, discriminatory, and/or exclusionary conduct be permanently 
enjoined to abate to actual and threatened irreparable injury to Dreamstime’s 
business and property; 
8.        Plaintiff be awarded actual, compensatory, and/or consequential 
damages on its breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing claims; 
9.         Pursuant to section 17203 of the California Business & Professions 
Code, the unfair and/or unlawful business practices of defendant be permanently 
enjoined; 
10.       Pursuant to sections 17203 and 17535 of the California Business & 
Professions Code, plaintiff be awarded restitution; 
11.       Pursuant to section 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees; 
12.       Award plaintiff prejudgment interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
13.  For such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.  
DATED:  March 28, 2018 BAKER MARQUART LLP 
   By   :
 Jaime Marquart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dreamstime.com, LLC 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL  
Plaintiff hereby demands, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) and Local Civil 
Rule 3-6, a trial by jury of all issues which are subject to adjudication by a trier of 
fact. 
 
 
DATED:  March 28, 2018  BAKER MARQUART LLP 
 By : 
 Jaime Marquart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dreamstime.com, LLC 
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